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ABSTRACT
The task of this research is to examine the epistemological 
premises inherent in Thornton W. Burgess' nature stories for children 
as defined by Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. Its 
purpose is to ident’fy these premises, examine them in light of 
Cassirer's philosophy, and explore their relevance to education theory.
Burgess holds that children are characterized by their potenti­
ality, that their interest in animals is inherent, that they 
instinctively sense themselves sut ;rj >r to animals, and that for 
these reasons it is possible to convey the child through
the medium of a fact-based animal story.
During the course of examination of the. r. iy
of Burgess' writings published between 1910 and 19../, two forms w 
presentation emerge: the mythic and the empirical-scientific . 
Examination of these trends in terms of Cassirer's philosophy discloses 
a progressive development of the way in which Burgess presents faces 
of nature. The resulting derivation of principles of this progression 





Statement of the Problem
The research problem is to examine the epistemological premises 
inherent in Thornton W. Burgess' nature stories for children as 
defined by Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the premises 
which guided Thornton W. Burgess in the creation of his bedtime nature 
stories for children, particularly in reference to those principles 
of symbolic form relevant to education theory.
Do 1imltati ons
This study is limited to an examination of Burgess' writings for 
children in relation to the principles of symbolic form. Tt is not a 
critique of Burgess' literary style or of other aspects of his 
technique. Rather, it focuses on five premises from which Burgess 
approaches writing:
1. A child's mind is characterized by its potentiality.
2. Children bear an Intrinsic interest in animal life.
3. Children intuitively sense themselves superior to animals.
. To be successful, animal stories must be factually correct
v?ith respect to natural essentials.
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5. It is possible to remain true to natural essentials, yet to 
convey human moral lessons through symbolization. Nature stories are 
thus "unequalled as a vehicle for conveying information of all kinds" 
(1922b, p. 137).
Subjects of analysis are limited to Burgess' writings on his own 
method and theory and to the AO books of his Old Mother West Wind 
sLories (8 titles); Bedtime Story-Books (20 titles); and Green Meadow, 
Green Forest, and Smiling Pool series (A titles each), which represent 
Ills most productive and formative years (1910-1927).
The essential concepts brought to the analysis are those of the 
philosophy of symbolic forms, as defined by Ernst Cassirer in his 
principal writings.
Limitations
Precedent for this study is limited by the absence of any exhaustive 
formal investigation either into Burgess' writings or into the 
principles with which he approaches writing for children. The study 
is therefore substantially exploratory, and is limited to an analytic 
examination of the role of symbolic form and epistemological principles.
Need for_tlie Stud_v
Cassirer (1953b) writes, with respect to his theory, "If all 
culture is manifested in the creation of specific image-worlds, specific 
symbolic fotms, the aim of philosophy is not to go behind all these 
creations, but rather to understand and elucidate their basic formative 
principle" (p. 113). Need for this study rests upon the contention 
that the "understanding and elucidation of this basic formative 
principle" is not merely the rightful aim of philosophy, but that it
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also bears directly upon the epistemological foundations of education. 
Cassirer has provided insight into the principles of symbolic form.
What is needed is a demonstration of their relevance to the field of 
education.
Bac.kground of the Study
Agosta (1983) describes Burgess as "one of the most prolific 
writers of nature stories for children" (p. 73), noting that he 
produced more than 70 books of nature stories and more than 15,000 
syndicated newspaper columns during his 55—year career— from 1910 
until his death in 1965.
Burgess' early stories, which began simply as bedtime tales for 
his own son and the first of which were mailed to his son during a 
brief absence, are characteristically of two sorts: (a) explanatory 
tales, which reveal facts of nature and explain them, often mythically; 
and (b) morality tales, which offer a moral lesson to the child reader. 
In later cases, particularly as Burgess’ technique matured, these 
themes were blended and are less readily distinguishable, hut certain 
factors remain constant in all the tales: Animals are personified and 
given names, they engage in dialogue with one another, and some lesson 
is offered to the child reader through events and dialogue as the 
story develops.
At the same time, Burgess says, "in my writing I strive not to 
deviate from the prosaic facts as Mother Nature presents them" (1960, 
p. 5). This presents a question which Burgess was compelled repeatedly 
to answer: How can one remain true to the facts of nature, yet present 
animals clothed, speaking, and presenting moral conclusions? Agosta 
(1.983) states uie pud 'em categorically: "One cannot simultaneously be
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true to animal nature and to a human moral code" (p. 77).
Burgess justifies the speech and clothing of his characters (by
illustrators George Kerr and Harrison. Cady) in this way:
The only concessions to pure imagination are the.speech put 
in their mouths, and in the license of the illustrator in 
clothing them. The former is necessary in order to make a 
story, and does not mitigate the truth or in the smallest 
degree offend those seeking the truth because there is 
general recognition of the fact that there is some means 
of communication between animals. The clothing of the 
characters by the illustrator merely serves to' more firmly 
establish them as real personalities. (1923c, pp. 135-136)
The third aspect, that of drawing moral conclusions, Burgess
addresses in this way:
The lives of our four-footed and feathered neighbors run 
parallel to our own. What we experience they experience, 
only in lesser degree. Keeping this in mind together with 
the fact that the child intuitively understands and 
recognizes his superiority, it becomes a simple matter to 
convey to the child any desired lesson through the medium 
of a story concerning a member of the lesser orders. But 
always there must be rigid adherence to truth and fact in 
regard to these characters. It is because the child 
recognizes that the stories are true in all essentials 
that the lesson Ls at once take home. Thus the story that 
humanizes the animal to the point of the impossible is 
bound to fail in its purpose from an educational standpoint. 
(1922b, 1960, p. 213)
Placing Burgess "somewhere near the middle of [a] generic
continuum," Agosta (1983) defines the continuum in this way:
At one end are those stories presenting animals which are 
actually humans decked out in fur or feathers, and at the 
other end are those stories concerned with presenting 
animal life in a strictly realistic way. Stories true to 
animal nature present behavior consistent with the animal's 
species. . . .  At the other end of the continuum are those 
animal stories which offer little or no pretense that their 
animal characters are other than human beings in disguise.
These stories . . . present animals with all the virtues,
vices, aspirations, and disappointments of human beings; 
these stories, fire true, not to animal, but to human nature.
(p. 76)
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Burgess' overall aim was twofold: (a) to entertain, and (b) to 
educate. His efforts to educate took two directions— teaching natural 
history and teaching human moral codes. As he says of the early years 
of his career:
I. was gaining some reputation as an entertainer of children.
This was encouraging and stimulating, but what I most craved 
was recognition of the underlying purpose of my work. This 
could come only through endorsement from educators and 
leaders in the various fields of natural science. (1960, 
pp. 126-127)
v
Burgess' specific aims in writing were' thus threefold:
(a) entertainment, (b) teaching natural history, and (c) teaching 
morality. It was in the attempt to reconcile these different aims 
that Burgess arrived at his characteristically "hybrid" characters 
which wear clothes, speak, demonstrate, moral premises, and yet remain 
allegedly true to the habits of their species.
Background of the Philosophy of 
Symbolie Forms
Immanuel Kant was first to establish, as Ernst Cassirer later 
explicitly stated, "that there is a universal and essential form of 
knowledge and that philosophy is called upon and qualified to discover 
this form and establish it with certainty" (1953b, p. 8). Kant 
accordingly established two a priori forms of sensuous intuition— space 
and time— and further set forth 12 categories of understanding which 
relate the phenomena perceived through these forms in terms of cause 
and effect, substance and attribute. Against these forms of intuition 
(space and time) and intellection (the categories), Kant distinguished 
the external content of experience— that which is formed in experience. 
The form and content of experience Kant united in a set of schemata, 
each one of which synthesizes them into the phenomenon. It is not the
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forms of intuition, nor the categories of understanding, ncc the 
external content of perception which are experienced, but the schemata 
alone in their synthetic unit,y. Schemata, for Kant, comprise the 
entire content of human experience (Kant, 1929).
It was these schemata which fascinated the Kant scholar, Ernst 
Cassirer, who would later extend the Kantian method to encompass not 
only reason but all human representational activity— reason, art, 
history, language, mathematics— in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
Although one may not know more of the world in itself than that it 
is, said Kant, one may know and define one's own methods of knowing. 
Nature in itself, as a conceptual whole, never has been nor can it be 
in our grasp. Yet, objective inquiry has always aimed at the goal of 
creating a universal concept of nature under which all other concepts 
may be subsumed. However, Kant pointed out, such inquiry has always 
relied upon the content of experience to order this search; and this 
is not justified without first having verified the mechanism of 
experience. As an absolute and veridical regulative telos for objective 
inquiry, Kant proposed instead the Idea, which as in Plato remains the 
unifying force behind scientific progress toward any unified concept 
whatever. Idea, said Kant, is implicit in all rational quest.
It follows that, for Kant, the principle of the Ide_a of nature is 
an a priori necessity for growth of any valid knowledge about nature. 
Furthermore, the Idea of a unified whole of nature is to be seen as 
regulative onLv in terms of our systematic knowing about nature. It 
is by no means to be thought of as constitutive within nature in itself,
independent of a knower.
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The fundamental question asked by Cassirer is this: How can these 
principles be applied to other forms of cultural expression? Is the 
rational the only valid mode of the expression of culture? Are not 
myth, art, language, music, and history also cultur. 1 forms, each 
striving toward its own unique yet unified representation of experience? 
If so, Kant will have analyzed but one cultural form among many—  
organized thought or "pure reason."
For Cassirer, the forms and categories of Kant's method are not 
in question. Rather, the schema serves as an axial concept for 
discovering the a priori forms of all cultural representation— that 
is, all symbolic forms.
Such a concept of symbolic forms may apply to- any experience given 
in representation. The scientist represents experience through reason, 
in theory. The artist represents experience through artifacts, in art. 
The speaker represents experience through language, in words. Each of 
these, and others as well, has its own formulative principle by which 
expression is possille. What, asks Cassirer, Is the a priori principle 
of such representation in general? His answer is symbolization:
"Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should 
define him as an animal symbolicuin. By so doing we can designate his 
specific difference, and we can understand Che new way open to man— the 
way of civilization" (1966a, p. 26}.
An exhaustive analysis of the principles of Kant's critiques or 
of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is beyond the scope of this 
study. Rather, the study will focus on those aspects of the philosophy 
of symbolic forms which provide insight into the writings of Thornton 
Burgess and the problem of reconciling natural essentials with moral
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lessons. It will thereby serve to emphasize the epistemological 
significance of Burgess' method and its value as a guide in demonstrating 
basic principles of universal significance to the epistemological 
foundations of education.
Descriptive Definitions
The following definitions are given to provide a determinate point
of reference 
Defined are 
method as we 
It is these.
for terms used extensively in the following pages, 
terms which Burgess uses frequently in his writings on 
11 as those central to the philosophy of symbolic forms, 
terms which will be carried to the analysis of Burgess'
theories and their products.
Conception. The unitary, determinate ground of both thought and
speech, simultaneously and mutually, is the concept. Cassirer explains:
How does language succeed in escaping from that Heraclitean 
river of change, in which no content recurs truly identical—  
how does language place itself, as it were, in opposition to 
this flux, and abstract determinate forms from it? Here lies 
the true secret of predication as a problem both of logic and 
of language. The beginning of thought and speech is not 
this: we do not simply seize on and name certain distinctions
that are somewhere present in feeling or intuition; on the 
contrary, on our own initiative we draw certain dividing 
lines, effect certain separations and connections by virtue 
of which distinct individual configurations emerge from the 
uniform flux of consciousness. (1953b, p. 280)
These "configurations" are concepts. The process of their formation 
is concept ion.
The function of the concept is precision in representation. 
"Hence," Cassirer continues, "the original and decisive achievement oL
the concept is not to compare representations and group them according 
to genera and species, but rather to form impressions into representa­
tions" (1953b, p. 281).
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As the formation of such representations is refined, they are 
shaped and changed. Thus, for example, the concept "species" in 
natural science has changed substantially over many years from 
Aristotle's original conception, as the "separations and connections" 
effected by science have changed. The result is a more precise 
definition of what is meant by "species."
The effect of such development is that, as Cassirer notes, "the 
primary function of concept formation is not . . .  to raise our 
representations to ever greater universality; on the contrary, it is 
to make them increasingly determinate" (1953b, p. 280).
Creation. The. formation of representation from indeterminate 
beginnings is termed creation. Creation begins in potentiality and
ends in the determinate’ representation of experience. It is a
/•; !. ■
conscious act of abstraction from the indeterminate continuum of change 
for the purpose of such formation. The absolute end of a creative act 
is the formation of a unified, determinate representation of the whole.
Cassirer (1955) provides an example of creation in the development 
of Roman theology:
In searching the sky for omens of man's undertakings on 
earth the augur began by dividing it into definite sectors.
The east-west line, established by the course of the sun, 
was bisected by a vertical from north to south. With this 
intersection of the two lines the decumanus and the cardo, 
as they were called in the language of the priests, 
religious thinking created its first schema of coordinates.
(P- 100) . r \
Fact. By fact is meant the conception of any singular content of 
experience in the absence of imagination. That a particular skunk has 
stripes is a fact. That females of a certain species of bird lay 
speckled eggs is a fact. That such a skunk has eaten one of the 
speckled eggs may also be a fact, given veridical evidence. Facts are
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representations of experience and what reason may extract from 
experience through proof.
It is understood that facts, taken in this sense, are at a deeper 
stratum themselves the conceptual product of creative abstraction.
Eut in their particular conceptual milieu these abstractions have * 
assumed the role of conceptual conventions so deeply rooted as to 
seem invariable. It is this apparent invariability, this conceptual 
necessity, which determines their facticitv. However, as Cassirer
explains further:
There is no such thing as sheer facticitv, as an external 
and immutable datum: on the contrary, what we call a fact 
must always be theoretically oriented in some way, must 
be seen in reference to a definite conceptual system, 
which implicitly determines it. (1957, n. 409)
T.n accordance with Kant's principle that one cannot grasp the 
external content of experience— the thing in itself— Cassirer further 
asserts that facts "are valid not insofar as they reproduce a given 
rigid being but insofar as they comprise a project for possible 
postulations of unity, which project must progressively be confirmed
in practice, in application to the empirical material" (1957, p. 476).
Einstein (1950) echoes this assertion:
The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, 
as complete, as possible, of the connection between the 
sense experiences in their totality, and, on the. other 
hand, the accomplishment of this aim by the use of a 
minimum of primary concepts and relations. . . . The
story goes on until we have arrived at a system of the • 
greatest conceivable unity, and of the greatest poverty 
of concepts of the logical foundations, which are still 
compatible with the observation made by our senses.
(p. 63)
With respect to the ultimate relativity of facts, Cassirer says:
It is not a matter of disclosing the ultimate, absolute 
elements of reality, in the contemplation of which thought 
may rest as it were, but of a never-ending process through
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which the relatively necessary takes the place of the rela­
tively accidental and the relatively invariable that of the 
relatively variable. We can never claim that this process 
has attained to the ultimate invariants of experience.
(1957, pp. 475-476)
Experience. The conscious relation of subject and object in any 
process is termed experience. Such process may be immediate 
(sensation, intuition) or mediate (conception, unification). The 
natural result of experience is knowledge, without which experience 
would be mere empty occurrence. "This transformation occurs," says 
Cassirer,
when a different signification, a different "valence" is 
attributed to the factors of the flowing change. Insofar 
as we conceive each phenomenon as belonging solely to the 
sphere of change it is, strictly speaking, "given" only in 
a single point of time: the moment creates it and snatches 
it away. Definite halting places, relative points of rest, 
can be gained in this unceasing change only because the 
particular contents, though variable and ephemeral in their 
. facticity, point themselves to something permanent— something 
of which all these changing images are only diverse aspec.ts.
Once the variable has thus been taken as the representation 
of a constant, it takes on an entirely new face. (1957,
P. 154)
Experience thus "takes on a new face" by becoming knowledge. Knowledge 
is signified experience. Experience is therefore the indeterminate 
ground of the formation of concepts and thus of knowledge.
Imagination. The creative move toward unification in the absence 
of veridical relationships is termed imagination. It is the relation 
of facts, concepts, or intuitions to produce a unified representation; 
for example, a myth or a hypothesis. But such relation must be 
conducted in the absence of proof, for imagination is avi act of 
absolute creativity. Cassirer defines the role of imagination in this
way:
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If perception is to signify anything at all— if it is to be 
perception for an ego and perception of something— it must 
possess certain theoretical criteria of validity. . . . For 
the union of sensory perceptions or representations in one 
consciousness and their reference to one object are never a 
matter ‘of mere sensory receptivity but are always based on 
an "act of spontaneity." And it now becomes evident that 
just as there is a spontaneity of the pure understanding, 
of logical, scientific thought and construction, so there 
is also a spontaneity of the pure imagination. (1957, p. 9)
Myth and science differ in their application of imagination in
that whereas hypothesis demands judgments based upon empirical
reference, myth admits of no such need. Thus, in science, facts are
synthesized by imagination into a hypothesis which is subsequently
carried to experiment to produce new or refined concepts. In myth,
the same facts are synthesized by imagination into a representative
whole which stands by itself. Thus, in science, imagination produces
means; whereas in myth it produces ends.
Intuition. This term is here defined as the achievement of unity
in immediate apperception. Bergson distinguishes intuition and analysis
in this way:
We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is trans­
ported into the interior of an object in order to coincide 
with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in 
it. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which 
reduces the object to elements already known, that is, 
common to that object and to others. Analyzing then 
consists in expressing a thing in terms of what is not it. 
(1965, pp. 161-162)
The sole function of intuition is immediate unification; for as 
Bergson points out, any attempt to qualify the achievement is of 
necessity analytic. Intuition is thus always immediate. As soon as 
an intuitive experience is qualified in a mediate conceptual frame 
or reference, it ceases to be intuitive and becomes systematic or 
rational— that is, symbolic.
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By virtue of this immediacy, intuition is veridical, but only as 
intuition. Thus, one may intuit the redness of a rose petal; but in 
comparing it with the redness of any other object one must abstract 
the concept "redness," which remains then static and apart from the 
intuition itself.
Interest. As here defined, interest is the spur to imagination.
It rests upon the belief that unification is possible, and is thus the 
motive force behind all representational synthesis. "All concept 
formation," notes Cassirer,
is ultimately oriented toward one fundamental goal, toward 
determination of the "absolute truth." Ultimately thought 
seeks to fit all particular propositions, all. particular 
conceptual structures into a unitary and all-inclusive 
intellectual context. (1957, p. 284)
Interest is manifest in the belief that a given object of experience
Is of value in this process.
Knowledge. The representation of experieice is here termed 
knowledge. Knowledge is constituted of primary and secondary concepts 
taken into memory. These concepts may or may not have been synthesized 
to produce understanding.
In the broadest sense, knowledge is cognized experience and
derives from any sensation. Such knowledge is characterized in the
phrase, "1 know." Intuitive knowledge is characterized by the phrase,
"I know that." Conceptual knowledge is characterized by the phrase,
"I know that is X." And unified knowledge, or understanding, is
\
characterized by the phrase, "I know that is always and only X."
Such a hierarchy of experience exemplifies the progressive 
tendency of experience toward representation and of representation 
toward understanding. Thus, sensation is cognized essence; intuition
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is cognized sensation; conception is recognized intuition; and 
understanding is recognized conception.
Primary conception is that derived solely from intuitions, that 
is, from empirical experience. Secondary conception, that derived 
from primary concepts, when it has progressed to unified conception 
is termed understanding.
Language. This term defines the symbolic form.of conceptual 
representation. "Spiritual content," writes Cassirer, "and its 
sensuous exoression are united: the former is not an independent, 
self-contained entity preceding the latter, but is rather completed 
in it and with it" (1953b, p. 178). Language and conception arc thus 
two aspects of the same phenomenon— that is, thought. It is language 
which gives thought its form, thought which is formed in language.
Learning. The progressive building of knowledge toward under­
standing on the level of the whole is termed learning. The theoretic 
end point of learning is a unified veridical concept of the whole 
(understanding of the whole). Within its particular intellective 
context, such a unified concept of the whole will, by definition, 
include any future intuitions or concepts as automatically subsumed. 
Learning is thus the synthesizing of knowledge.
Myth. MytIV is the symbolic form which constitutes the first step 
toward conceptual abstraction. It is a representational synthesis of 
sense impressions whose principal function is unification. Thus, as 
Cassirer explains, the mythic mind conceives "an unbroken continuous 
whole which does not admit of any clean-cut and trenchant distinctions" 
( 1 9 6 6 a , p . 8 1 ) .
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The continuous whole conceived in myth, says Cassirer, "discloses 
a very different character from that conceptual whole in which 
cognition strives to comprehend reality. . . . [H]ere, bn the contrary, 
all reality is smelted down into concrete unifying images" (1955, 
p. 62). This is the primary distinction between myth and science, as 
Cassirer further notes:
Whereas scientific cognition can combine elements only by 
differentiating them in the same basic critical act, myth 
seems to roll up everything it touches into unity without 
distinction. The. relations it postulates are such that 
the elements which enter into them not only enter into a 
reciprocal ideal relationship, but become positively 
identical with one another, become one and the same thing.
(1955, p. 63)
Change in the mythic frame is thus not a function of cause and
effect, as it is in science, but is characterized instead by
metamorphosis from one unified image to another, accomplished without
need of rational explanation:
When scientific thinking considers the fact of change, it 
is not essentially concerned with the. transformation of a 
single given thing into another; on the contrary, it regards 
this transformation as possible and admissible only insofar 
as a universal law is expressed in it, insofar as it is 
based on certain functional relations and determinations 
which can be regarded as valid independently of the mere 
here and now and of the constellation of things in the 
here and now. Mythical "metamorphosis," on the other hand, 
is always the record of an individual event— a change from 
one individual and concrete material form to another. (1955, 
p. 47)
What Cassirer here terms "smelting down into concrete unifying 
images" and "rolling everything up into unity without distinction" 
thus stands as the correlate in myth to logical synthesis in science.' 
For its synthesis, myth employs imagination or, as CasS.irer terms it, 
"magical intervention." This is the primary procedural difference 
between myth and science, for in order to achieve a unified conception
16
in science one must learn the necessary logical relationships; whereas 
in myth the mechanism of unification is solely that of imagination.
Nature. Nature is here used to mean both the whole and the Idea 
of the whole. The term thus includes both human and nonhuman spheres 
of experience, both knower and known, both thing in itself and the 
concept which represents it. Nature, as here defined, thus stands as 
the indeterminate ground of all symbolic forms, both in the sense that 
it has the potentiality to form and in the sense that it has the 
potentiality to be formed. Nature is thus creative and created.
Nature is the totality of all that is.
Symbolic, form. "Every authentic function of the human spirit," 
writes Cassirer,
has this decisive characteristic in common with cognition: 
it does not merely copy but rather embodies an original, 
formative power. Tt does not express passively the mere 
fact that something is present but contains an independent 
energy of the human spirit through which the simple 
presence of the phenomenon assumes a definite "meaning," 
a particular ideational content. This is ns true of art 
as it is of cognition; it is as true of myth as of religion.
All live in particular image-worlds, which do not merely 
reflect the empirically given, but which rather produce it 
in accordance with an independent principle. Each of these, 
functions creates its own symbolic forms which, if not 
similar to the intellectual symbols, enjoy equal rank as 
products of the human spirit. (1953b, p. 78)
Thus, for Cassirer art is the symbolic form which represents experience.
in sculpture, painting, or batik. Language is the symbolic form which
represents experience in thought, speech, or writing. Myth is the
symbolic form which represents experience in concrete and unitary
conceptual images.
The function of al l. symbolic forms is the representation of 
experience, '•hat is, the production of knowledge.
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Universal. The term universal is here reserved for the realm of 
concepts only. A universal is a secondary concept derived from the 
relation of primary concepts. However, as Cassirer notes, "Language 
cannot [first] aim to institute connections of the manifold, which 
come under a universal rule, but it must first perform the preliminary 
task of giving to each particular impression an intrinsic signification" 
(1953b, p. 28!). That is, one cannot derive the universal concept 
"color" from an experience of manifold colors without having first 
derived concepts for the various colors themselves. Universals are 
synthetic products. Primary concepts, derived from intuitions, are 
likewise synthetic; but it is only in an analysis of them that their 
similarities to other primary concepts may be determined. Intuitions 
cannot be analyzed. Therefore, universals may only be secondary 
concepts.
Unification. Synthesis into an objective whole is termed 
un LCleation. Primary conception is the unification of manifold 
intuitions. Secondary conceptions are the unifications of primary 
conceptions.
Unification is the tejos of both rational synthesis and creative 
imagination. A unified representation of the whole is the aim of all 
knowledge.
Understanding■ Understanding is a unified synthesis of conceptions 
(facts, in science), the relational elements of which arc certain. 
Understanding is unique to language and reason, for unification is 
Intrinsic in myth, and the logical relation of concepts foreign.
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Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 is a review of related literature in four parts. Part 
one. is a review of the literature written by Burgess for children.
It is primarily bibliographic. Part two is a review of Burgess' 
writings about his method and philosophy. Part three is a review of 
critical literature by others about Burgess' writings for children. 
Part four is a review of the literature pertinent to an understanding 
of the philosophy of symbolic forms and its development.
In chapter 3, Burgess' fundamental premises are unfolded and 
explained. In this chapter, four research questions are considered:
1. What is Burgess’ conception of nature?
2. What is Burgess' conception of the reader of his stories?
3. What is Burgess' conception of learning, and how does he
conceive the role of his writings in :hat process?
A. Upon w h t  perceived authority do Burgess' moral lessons^
rest?
The examination of Burgess' premises, as defined in chapter 3, 
constitutes the substance of chapter A. This examination is made in 
terms of the philosophy of symbolic forms and is essentially analytic. 
Considered are the following seven research questions:
1. What does Burgess mean by facts and what is their role in 
his symboli/at ions?
2. What is the role of creativity in Burgess' symbolizations?
3. To what degree and in what ways is Burgess' interpretation 
of natu' determinec; to what degree and in what ways free?





'5. What is the fundamental relationship between potentiality, 
creativity, and facts?
6. What is the relationship between symbolization, interest, 
and imagination?
7. How does symbolization produce understanding?
CHAPTER II
Review of Related Literature
Children's Literature by- 
Burgess— Bibliographic
Burgess wrote a sizeable volume^ of periodical literature before
1910, much of it under the pseudonymous by-line W. B. Thornton.
Including the book. The Bride's Primer (Burgess, 1905), this writing
is varied, but does not include any animal literature specifically for
children. Burgess considered Old Mother West Wind (Burgess, 1910) to
be his "first book," and as Agosta (1983) notes:
Though later collections of tales evince certain technical 
refinements over these first stories, Burgess was committed 
to the animal story for the remainder of his productive 
years. (p. 76)
Old Mother West Wind was followed by Mother West Wind's Children 
(Burgess, 1911) and Mother West Wind's Animal Friends (1912b), both 
of which extend and refine the techniques of storytelling found in 
Old Mother West Wind.
In 1912. Burgess also began his explicit promotion of the Boy 
Scout program with the first of his Boy Scouts series (Burgess, 1912a, 
191.3c, 1914e, 1915e). These are not elsewhere treated in this study.
Mother West Wind's Neighbors (Burgess, 1913d) appeared in 1913, 
along with the first of the Bedtime Story-Books, The Adventures of 





The Mother West: Wind and Bedtime Story-Book series occupied 
Burgess' attention through 1918, when Happy Jack (Burgess, 1918c), 
first of the Green Meadow series, appeared. The Mother West Wind 
series was completed, at 8 volumes, in 1918; and the Bedtime Story-Books 
finished, at 20 volumes, in 1919. The Green Meadow, followed by the 
Green Forest and Smiling Pool series, at A titles each, were produced 
during the period 1918 to 1927. The Mother West Wind, Bedtime 
Story-Book, Green Meadow, Green Forest, and Smiling Pool series— totaling 
AO titles1— constitute .the subject of this study. A complete list of 
these titles is given beginning on page 22.
Wright (1979; lists Burgess' accomplishment as consisting in 
"over 70 full-scale books, more than 100 picture and paper books,
15,000 daily newspaper Bedtime Stories, and many other magazine stories, 
articles and poems" (p. 7). According to Titcomb in Lovell (1974), 
the total is 171; and Agosta (1983) attributes "over seventy books" 
to Burgess. The uncertainty of these figures stems from the fact that 
many of the individual tales, which constitute chapters in the "full- 
scale books," first appeared as syndicated newspaper columns— the 
rights to wh’ch Burgess did not retain ("Is This a Fair Deal?", 1941). 
These tales were widely republished both as syndicated columns and as 
paperback books by publishers other than Burgess' own (Little, Brown 
and Company).
Five bibliographic references delineate this Burgess corpus.
Wright (1979) provides descriptions and notes on the contents of all 
known book-form publications by Burgess, including photographs of 
major edition covers and title pages, a listing of translations and 
foreign editions, chronologies, and a checklist of sources on Burgess.
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His is Che most comprehensive bibliography available on Burgess.
Dowhan (1977) provides an annually updated magazine article
bibliography and annotated timeline of Burgess' periodical writings.
Titcomb, in Lovell (1974), gives an alphabetical listing of 171 book
titles, many of which are the aforementioned republications and
paperbacks. This listing he claims to be "the most complete published
list of Mr. Burgess' books compiled to dat*5." Commire (1979) provides
a synoptic listing of the Burgess corpus in addition to her biographical
sketch of Burgess. And Agosta (1983) begins his analysis of Burgess
with a list of "selected books" totaling 92.
The following is a chronological list, by series, of those
volumes considered in this study:
Mo ther West Wind Ser ies (1910-1918)
Old Mother WesC_ Wind (1910)
Mother West Wind's Children (1911)
Mother West Wind's Animal Friends (1912b)
Mother West Wind's Neighhors (1913d)
Mother West Wind "Why" Stories (1915f)
Mother West Wind "How" Stories (1916e)
Mother West Wind "When" Stories (1917c)
Mother West Wind "Where" Stories (1918d)
Bedtime Story-Book Series (1913-1919)
The Adventures of Johnny Chuck (1913a)
The Adventures of Reddy Fox (1913b)
The Adventures of Unc' Billy Possum (191Ad)
The Adventures of Mr. Mocker (1914b)
The Adventures of Jerry Muskrat (1914a)
The Adventures of Peter Cottontail (1914c)
The Adventures of Grandfather F*-og (1913c)
The Adventures of Chatterer The Red Squirrel
The Adventures of Danny Meadow Mouse (1915b)
The Adventures of Sammy Jay (1915d)
The Adventures of Old Mr. Toad (1916c)
The Adventures of Old Man Coyote (1916b)
The Adventures of Buster Bear (1916a)
The Adventures of Prickly Porky (1916d)
The Adventures of Poor Mrs. Quack (1917b)
The Adventures of Paddy The Beaver (1917a)
The Adventures of Jimmy Skunk (1918b)
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The Adventures of Bobby Coon (1918a)
The Adventure.-; of 01' Mistah Buzzard (1919b)
The Adventures of Bob White (1919a)
Green Meadow Series (1918-1920)
Happy Jack (1918c)
Mrs. Peter Rabbit (1919e)
Bowser The Hound (1920a)
Old Granny Fox (1920c1
Green Forest Series (1921-1923/
Lightfoot The Deer (1921a)
Blacky The Crow (1922a)
Whitefoot the Wood Mouse (1922c)
Buster Bear's Tv ins (1923b)
Smiling Pool Series (192A— 1927)
Billy Mink (1924a)
Little Joe Otter (1925)
Jerry Muskrat at Home (1926)
Longlegs The Heron (1927)
Also published during this period, in addition to the afore­
mentioned Boy Scouts series, are the W ishing Stone series (Burgess, 
19l5g, 1921b, 1921c.) and three more prosaic works titled The Burgess 
Bird Book for Children (Burgess, 1919c); The Burgess Animal Book for 
Children (Burgess, 1920b); and The Burgess Flower Book for Children 
(Burgess, 1923a). The Boy Scouts and Wishing Stone series consist of 
juvenile, novels in the human realm, and although animals figure 
prominently in some ol them, neither series is, strictly speaking, 
animal fiction. The third group of books, Illustrated by Louis 
Agassiz Fuertes and provided with indices including technical names, 
is intended to present factual information in a handbook format for 
children. Although a modified story format is used, in conception 
these three books are not stories out field guides.
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Expository Literature by Burgess 
on Method
Among Burgeon' writings other than children's fiction and nature
guides several articles explain his approach to writing for children.
From these writings are derived the five premises given in chapter 1.
Premise J.. A child*s mind is characterized by its potentiality.
Burgess (1923c) characterizes the child's mind metaphorically: "The
bent twig shapes the tree. Even more susceptible is the child mind."
And he also characterizes it categorically:
Here are found all those latent forces for good and evil; 
for the uplifting of the race and for its destruction; for 
the triumph of civilization and for its overthrow. The. 
minds of youth are fallow ground ready for the seed, and 
every adult who comes in contact with a boy or girl is, 
consciously or unconsciously, a sower of seed. . . .  As 
the boy or the girl is led to think, so will the man or 
woman become an active force. (1923c, p. 135).
Burgess thus conceives the child's mind in terms of its potential 
to become an active force and In terms of the indeterminacy of its 
beginnings.
Premise 2. Children bear an Intrinsic, interest in animal life. 
"Interest in living things is inherent," says Burgess (1924b, p. 48). 
In recalling two discoveries made when he began writing nature 
stories, Burgess says:
The first of these was the universal interest in animals 
and birds. It is not confined to children. I question if 
there is another subject which can even approach animal 
life., in universal appeal to young and old. Whether the 
child be of the country or the city, lie or she Is at 
once Interested in animals. (!922b, p. 137)
This universal interest Burgess traces to "dawn man," noting:
By force of circumstance his sole interest in life must 
have been in the animals and other creatures surrounding 
him. I-Iis very existence depended on constant observation 
of them. Such intelligence as he had was constantly
25
concerned with them. . . . This interest has persisted ever 
since, and probably always will persist. (1922b, p. 137)
These words were sufficiently axiomatic for Burgess that they
appeared unchanged in his autobiography (Burgess, 1960, p. 210).
Premise 3. Children intuitively sense themselves superior to
animals. Burgess explains his view:
Intuitively the smallest child is conscious that it is 
superior to any animal. It knows that is a higher being.
No child will admit that any animal knows more than he 
does, and this is especially true of the smaller animals.
Much ns the adult looks down to the level of the child, 
the child in turn looks down on the level of the squirrel 
and the rabbit. 11922b, p. 138)
This view is expressed in both primary and secondary sources on
Burgess (Burgess, 1923c, 1924b, 1960; Nordell, I960; Walsh, 1927).
Premise k . To be successful, animal stori.es must_ be factually
correct with respect_to natural essentials. "Prom the beginning,"
writes Burgess (1923c), "the underlying thought was to foster a love
of nature by presenting in story form the truth about the daily lives
of the birds, animals, and lower .forms of life most easily observed
by the average child." And, lie adds:
No smallest incident is used which cannot be substantiated 
by two or more recognized authorities. Thus the reader 
of a series of stories concerning Johnny Chuck comes to 
have an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the 
habits and daily life of the woodchuck. (1923c, p. 135)
This does not mean for Burgess, however, that animals may not be.
personified. Burgess explains the purpose of such personification
i.n this way:
Country boys have written me that they have given tip 
trapping. To these boys trapping meant not only a 
genuine source of pleasure but a source of needed 
income. No one asked them to give up trapping. Tn
none of my work had I ever asked boys to give up 
trapping. But I had used a series of stories in which 
were told the experiences of Jerry Muskrat and Billy 
Mink with traps.
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By che simple expedient of giving these animals names 
they became personalities. From their own knowledge of the 
habits of these animals the boys recognized that the stories 
were true. They were not the experiences of any one 
particular muskrat or mink, but of all muskrats and minks.
The moment these animals were given personality they 
became a part of the world of these boys and definitely 
more interesting alive than dead. (1922b, pp. 138-139)
And, he qualifies the role of such personification in this way:
But always there must be rigid adherence to truth in 
regard to these characters. It is because the child 
recognizes that the stories are true in all essentials 
that the lesson is at once taken home. Thus the story 
that humanizes the animal to the point of the impossible 
is bound to fail in its purpose from an educational 
standpoint. (Burgess, 1922b, p. 139)
The limit of such personification Burgess defines in a direct
quote given by Harris (1956):
I. like to think truthfulness has helped me most of all 
Some writers, you know, have animals riding bicycles 
and doing all sorts of things. Kxcopt for giving the 
animals names— and every child names his dog or cat—  
and making them articulate, T have always been truthful, 
to nature; to the facts. (p. 18)
An example of tills combination of fact and personification is
given by Burgess in Walsh (1927):
They have the keenest sense of justice In the world, 
these1 folks to whom life is clean and new and so is 
filled with wonders. And when i say I have a friend, 
the homeliest fellow that T know, and his tongue is 
put in backwards, and when he wants a drink he absorbs 
it through his skin, and lid sings with his mouth closed, 
and he is covered with warts, I get them right away.
They know it is the toad, and after that they will watch 
a toad with new interest instead of killing it. (p. 8)
Tins the principal function of personification is, for Burgess,
to bring the animal into the social sphere of the child. But in
order that the animals in this sphere may serve as a means' of conveying
a story that will be retained and believed, the essential facts of
the animals' lives must not be altered.
27
Premise 5. It is possible to remain true to natural essentials 
vet to convey human moral Lessons through symbolization. In addition 
to his discovery of a universal interest in animals and birds, Burgess 
also notes:
The second discovery was that nature study is unequalled as 
a vehicle for conveying information of all. kinds. The 
driest of facts if imbedded in a nature story written so as 
to appeal to the imagination will not only be unhesitatingly 
accepted but will be permanently retained. (1922b, p. L37)
.Just what Burgess means by "information of all kinds" is explained
in "Nature Study the Key to Knowledge." Mere Burgess writes:
There is a psychology in nature study for children which 
many teachers fail to understand, and which makes it the 
most perfect vehicle for conveying to the child mind, in 
a way that is at once understood, practically all those 
things which it is desirable to teach. . . . Would you 
teach the meaning of love? The birds in the nesting 
season are living examples which cannot be misunderstood.
. . . Whitefoot . the wood mouse, and Timmy, the flying
squirrel, come forth after dark because it is safer for 
them then. Stories of these timid little wood folk have 
cured children of all fear of the dark. . . . Paddy, the
beaver, is a living example of the jov of constructive 
work and cooperation. The bees in their hive illustrate 
without comment how the individual cannot live for himself 
alone. (192Ah, p. 48)
Thus, more than merely Introducing the child mind to facts of 
nature, Burgess applies meaning to these facts in human terms. "Right 
here," says Burgess, "lies the psychology of the animal or nature 
story as an educational medium" (1922b, p . L38). It is because the 
child knows it is superior to animals; says Burgess, that they can 
become a medium for ue.v lesson which would rot otherwise b< § retained. 
Burgess explains:
The old-time story with an obvious moral aimed at the 
reader will not be read by the average child of today.
The child has no greater liking for a preachment than 
the average adult. A story containing an obvious moral 
and centering around human characters immediately becomes 
personal. There is instant recognition that that moral is 
intended for the reader. It is resented.
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On the other hand an animal story may have a moral 
introduced in the very beginning without giving the slightest 
offense. I have written hundreds of animal stories, each 
with a conspicuous moral, without bringing a single protest 
from my readers. Yet, should I write one of these stories 
with no change whatever save of substituting human characters 
for the animal characters, the story would not be read.
(1922b, p. 138)
"If Peter Rabbit does something wrong, they want him to be 
punished,” says Burgess of his child readers. "And when that happens 
they think they understand the lesson even better than Peter does" 
(Levine, 1967, p. 103).
The conclusion that Burgess derives from these observations is:
Nature study should begin the kindergarten and progress 
step by .step through all the grades. Instead of the 
secondary subject which it now Is, it should be a primary 
subject. It will, above all subjects, create the Love of 
truth and beauty without which the life of the individual 
is starved no matter to what heights of learning he may 
attain. (1922b, pp. 139-140)
"Nature study," writes Burgess (1924b), "is a basic element of
education. It is the golden key to the. vast storehouse of knowledge.
Through nature study, Burgess concludes:
The imagination cannot fail to be stimulated, and given 
interest and imagination, the doors of knowledge swing 
open. Without imagination there can be no progress.
Vision is but imagination governed by logic. (p. 49)
Burgess seeks to justify this belief in "Nature as the Universal
Teacher," when he writes:
There is little affecting human life which has not an 
analogy in the lives of the lower orders. It is because 
of this and my conviction of the universal Interest in 
animals plus the universal attitude of the child mind in 
regard to its superiority that I am convinced of the 
truth of the premise of my earlier statement that nature 
study should be the foundation of all education.
The child mind is colorful. Dry facts make no 
impression. The young mind cannot retain that in which 
it has no interest. Present those facts in such a way 
that the imagination may seize upon them and they will be 
impressed upon the memory forever. Nature presents an
interest which is inherent. It remains but to capitalize [sic] 
this by presenting that which it is desired to impart in such 
term that the imagination becomes but a setting for the truth. 
(1922b, p. 139)
These beliefs led Burgess to define his "recipe" for accomplishing
this end. It is presented in his autobiography as follows:
INGREDIENTS--Onc fact, a liberal amount of imagination with 
truth, a moral lesson, plenty oc good action, adventure or 
lively dialogue, humor or pathos as desired, sometimes both, 
and a reasonable amount of simple English.
These are best compounded on paper by means of a type­
writer, preferably one that is old, dusty and rich in 
service. Use the fact as a foundation. Stir in the 
imagination blended with truth, taking care that the latter 
is not dissolved in the former. Spice highly with action 
adventure or snappy dialogue, whichever best suits your 
purpose. Add a dash of humor or pathos or both. Pour the 
whole over the moral lesson and serve at bedtime in short 
sentences composed almost wholly of slmp.li? words. One or 
two big tongue—rollers may be introduced occasionally. A 
judicious amount of repetition is desirable. (1960, p. 218)
Rather than describing an architectural plan to which he adheres
as he writes, Burgess is here explaining what happens naturally as
he writes. The next paragraphs explain this:
When 1 write a story it has a plot.— afterward, not before.
Of course I. am wrong, but 1 am right —  for me. When 1 have 
one end of a ball of twine and want to get the other end,
1 simply unwind until i get to it. (1960, p. 219)
In summary, Burgess' approach to writing stems from these five
premises and may be stated ns follows: The child's mind, characterized
as indeterminate. in its potential, bears an intrinsic interest in
animals. Coupled to an intuitive sense of superiority to the animals,
these characteristics make it possible to convey to a child reader
"practically all those, things which it is desirable, to teach" through
the medium of a factually correct animal story. This approach taps
the imagination of the child while basing that imagination in fact,




"imagination becomes but a setting for the truth."
burgess' (1960) autobiography remains the most comprehensive 
single source of these premises. In "The Gold Mine I Discovered Wien 
I Was 33," Burgess (1919d) describes nis success in applying these 
premises to a career of writing for children.
Background and Critical Literature 
on Burgess
Wright's (1979) descriptive bibliography contains substantial 
material on Burgess' publishing history. Occasional brief analytic, 
passages punctuate an otherwise prosaic displv of information. The 
work is essentially a collector's guide to Burgess books.
Lovell (1974; provides abundant background information on Burgess' 
ancestry as well as his Sandwich, Massachusetts, childhood environment. 
However, .side from a brief chapter on his writing career after 1892 
and the 10-page bibliography contributed by Titcomb, little information 
on Burgess' writing is contained. This work takes the form of a 
genealogy and family album.
Commlre (1979) gives a compact abridgement of Burgess' autobio­
graphy and a listing of his publications. The work is largely 
biographical, and contains no critical material.
Other sources of biographical information include works hv 
Shepherd (1920), Walsh (1927), Tante (1931), P u b l i s h e r ' s  Weekly 
("Burgess Publishes," 1944; "Thornton W. Burgess," 1' ', and Carlson
(1969). Brief biographies are also included in obituaries (all in 
1965) in Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, Publisher's Weekly, and
Library Journal.
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Burgess' long association with Alice Rebecca Cooke, known to his 
radio audience as "Aunt Sally," is recounted in Aunt Sally's Friends 
in Fur (Bui'gess, 1955) and also by Furman (L948) . These works provide 
a personal glimpse of Burgess not to be found in other writings.
Noncritical human interest articles on Burgess have appeared 
regularly in trade magazines such as Li_fe, Nature, and Audubon since 
1920. Noteworthy among such articles are those by Bryan (1940),
Life Magazine ("Life Visits," 1944), Froman (1947), Kenney (1948),
Harris (1956), O'Neil (1960), Nordell (1960), Fox (1964), Levine (1967), 
Snltford (1973). O'Donnell (1978), and Pettingill (1983).
Insight into the promotional aspects of Burgess' career and his 
radio appearances may be found in an advertisement in Saturday Review 
("The Man Who," 1937, p. 16A) and an article in Literary Digest 
("The Burgess Radio," 1925).
Three trends are identifiable within the critical literature:
(a) naturalists and biologists who acknowledge both Burgess' precision 
in reporting natural facts and the influence his stories have had,
(b) a body of nonspecialists who acknowledge Burgess' success as a 
writer on the basis of his prolific output but reserve opinion on his 
factua.lity for some particular reason, and (c) children's literature 
specialists and librarians who are split approximately equally on
the literary merit of the Burgess corpus. The scarcity of material 
in this third category denies real basis for conclusion, however.
Among the first group, American Museum's Clyde Fisher, as quoted 
by Brooks (1980), says:
What an achievement! It would be difficult if not impossible 
to overestimate the value of [his] work in nature education 
and in conservation. (p. 218)
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Walsh (927) quotes William Hornnday, at the time director or
the New York Zoological Society, in this way:
Any man who can find his way into the hearts of a million 
children is a genius. If he carries a message of truth 
he is a benefactor. Thornton W. Burgess is both. (p. 8)
Personal testimony from those who grew up reading Burgess books
is found in several places. Spies (1966) writes:
Thornton W. Burgess was my mentor and very best friend, but 
lie didn't know it. I read his works as fast as they were 
published, and all of those writings put together had a 
great influence on me. They developed my whole attitude 
toward animals, and I. started seeing, or trying anyway, 
from the animals' viewpoints. This in turn matured into 
a feeling of companionship for all. the animals I've ever 
known. (p. 17)
And Pe.tting.ill (1983) concludes his essay on Burgess in this way:
Today I remember Thornton W. Burgess as a popular figure, 
admired for his accomplishments in educating young people 
about nature and conservation, and I remember him as a 
person, warm-hearted, entertaining and outgoing. And, 
just as important, I remember him with everlasting grati­
tude for introducing me early in life to the natural world 
that1has given me so much satisfaction ever since. (p. 101)
Not all readers of Burgess have applauded him, however.
Representing the nonspecialist critics of Burgess, Ogden Nash (1955),
writing In The New Yorker, questions Burgess' veracity with the poem,
"Mi-. Burgess, Meet Mr. Barmecide." "Oft in the sleepless night,"
Nash writes, "I play a game that is of interest only to me: T. try to
think of the character in fiction who 1 would rather not be." The
following conclusion "emerges," he says: "1 would most of all rather
not be Yowier the Bobcat in the Nature Stories of Thornton W. Burgess.
Mis reason, as revealed a few lines later, is that "unless someone
pilfered an installment to wipe out an ashtray with, Yowier hasn't
had a bite to eat in twenty years" (p. 26).
33
The question of unsuccessful predation in Burgess’ nature stories 
is likewise posed by The Outlook in the article, "When Do We Eat?" 
(1922) :
At the crucial moment there is always Sister South Wind or 
Brother Bluebird or Father Sun who warns the intended 
victim. What a profitable and delightful business it would 
be to write life insurance on the creatures of the forest 
who are working seven days a week as characters in these 
latest attempts to portray nature as she is not! (p. 330)
Criticism centering around this point Burgess dismisses with the
claim hat, as Nordell (I960) quotes him, "tragedy comes into a
child's life soon enough, and I don't believe in bringing tragedy
into a child's life." To which Burgess adds, "If Old Man Coyote did
eat it would be a case of when do eat?" (p. 11).
Among literature specialists, Meigs, Eaton, Nesbitt, and Viguers
(19.53) characterize Burgess' writing in this way:
A certain .amount of disapproval pertains to the term 
"bed-time stories." . . . in recent years, some of this 
disapprobation may have rubbed off on the seven [slcl 
volumes of the Old Mother West Wind (.I’Ol series. These 
books afford a good illustration of the fre uently iX1— 
defined line between am idea well handled an! an imitation 
weakly handled. Thornton Burgess' . . . Oil ’other West 
Wind stories are told simply and with charm. l'he personi­
fication of animals and the tales of their 11; s in the 
meadows are successful because they are convi u Ing and 
interesting. The imitations are maudlin, artificial and 
monotonous. (p. 368)
Krutch (I960) calls Burgess "the most read nature writer who ever
lived," noting with respect to his personifications:
Official science is notably impatient with popularizers, 
and to most scientists "anthropomorphism" is the 
unforgivable sin. Yet Mr. Burgess has a gold medal from 
the New York Zoological Society and another from the 
National Conservation Society, as well, as approval from 
. . . the eminent naturalist William T. Hornadny. Perhaps 
the nswer is that the "Bedtime Stories" distinguish fact 
fror fancy so clearly that even the childish mind knows 
perfectly which is which. They are no Aesopian fables.
For the most part the natural history is sound. The
dramatis personae do not usually do things real animals would 
not do. And if they talk about them as only human beings 
could, the convention is too patent to be misleading. (p. 18)
Agosta (19S3) provides a 14-page critical analysis of the Burgess
writings, pointing to what he terms "literary flaws," but acknowledging
Burgess' success and continued following:
Although Burgess's [sic] reading public was large and 
faithful, spanning several generations, he gained few 
admirers among critics of children's literature. The 
reason, perhaps, is that his works are so obviously 
formulaic. . . . The anthropomorphic, supra-zoological 
animal characters who act in these little morality plays 
are too often without any real complexity, each usually 
embodying a single emblematic characteristic. In 
addition, the formulaic nature of the stories frequently 
insured stock treatment of both situation and character 
and often Led to racial and sexual stereotyping as 
well. . . . [T]he stories often seem dated, relics from 
a past era, even though Burgess's [sic] concern for 
natural conservation, effectively expressed in many of 
his works, is probably more common now than it was in 
liis day. (p. 86)
"But," Agosta (1983) adds, "Burgess's [sic] large reading
audience obviously judged his works by a different set of criteria"
(p. 86). A review of Burgess' autobiography given in Newsweek ("One
Man's Kingdom," 1960) leaves little question of what Agosta is saying:
Three generations of Americans have been raised on the 
fictionalized nature lore of Thornton Burgess, and his 
astounding output of 15,000 stories enjoys a sentimental 
esteem which— for most adults— makes the question of 
their literarv worth a matter of gross irrelevance.
(p. 122)'
Literature on the Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms
A bibliography of the writings of Ernst Cassirer is ptovided by 
KlLbansky and Solmitz in Klibansky and Patou (1963, pp. 338-353).
They also include, a chronological listing of Cassirer's "principal 
works." A similar bibliography and Listing are given by Schilpp (1958)
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in the Library of Living Phj.losophers edition on The Philosophy of 
Ernst Cassirer. This bibliography, however, is current only to 1946 
and thus does not include the more recent translations.
Schilpp (1958) also includes 1 2 pages of biographical material 
on Cassirer; 23 critical and descriptive essays on his philosophy; 
and Cassirer's reply essay, "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary 
Philosophy." This volume offers a comprehensive overview of Cassirer's 
contribution to philosophy.
As a general introduction to his philosophy of culture, Cassirer 
wrote An Essay on Man (1966a), noting in the preface that it is to be 
taken as only an introduction. "My critics should . . .  be warned," 
he writes, "that what I could give here is more an explanation and 
illustration than a demonstration of my theory" (p. viii). As an 
Introduction this work is sufficiently general to include treatment 
of all the major symbolic forms he has defined: language, myth, art, 
religion, history, and science and mathematics.
Cassirer (1966a) defines what he calls "the crisis in man's 
knowledge of himself":
No former age was ever in such a favorable position with 
regard to the sources of our knowledge of human nature.
Psychology, ethnology, anthropology, and history have 
amassed an astoundingly rich and constantly increasing 
body of facts. Our technical instruments for observation 
and experimentation have been immensely improved, and our 
analyses have become sharper and more penetrating. We 
appear, nevertheless, not yet to have found a method for 
the mastery and organization of this material. When 
compared with our own abundance the past may seem very 
poor. But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a wealth 
of thoughts. Unless we succeed in finding a clue of 
Ariadne to lead us out of this labryinth, we can have, no 
real insight into the general, character of human culture; 
we shall remain lost in a mass of disconnected and 
disintegrated data whijh seem to lack all. conceptual 
unity. (p. 22)
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Cassirer's work was essentially a quest for understanding of 
the source and possible solution of this problem. Following the lead 
of biologist Johannes von Uexkiill, Cassirer arrived at the conclusion 
that the human world
forms no exception to those biological rules which govern 
the life of all other organisms. Yet in the human world 
we fi id a new characteristic which appears to be the 
distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of 
man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also 
undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, 
discovered a new method of adapting himself to his 
environment. Between the receptor system and the effector 
system, which are to be found in all animal species, we 
find in man a third link which we may describe as the 
symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the 
whole of human life. As compared with other animals man 
lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to 
speak, in a new dimension of reality. (1966a, p. 24)
This symbolic system, Cassirer discovered, takes many forms in
man. As he continues:
Yet there is no remedy against this reversal of the natural 
order. Man cannot escape from his own achievement. He. 
cannot but adopt the conditions of his own life. No longer 
in a merely physical universe, man lives.in a symboiic 
universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of 
this universe. They are the varied threads which weave 
the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience.
All human progress in thought and experience refines upon 
and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront 
reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face 
to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion 
as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing 
with the things themselves, man is in a sense constantly 
conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in 
linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols 
or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything 
except by the interposition of this artifical medium.
(1966a, p. 25)
Man is thus for Cassirer that animal which represents experience 
in symbolic forms. And if the need to adopt the conditions of this 
fact constitutes the specific problem of man, the unification of the 
representative forms constitutes, for Cassirer, the solution:
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In language, in religion, in art, in science, man can do no 
more than to build up his own universe— a symbolic universe 
that enables him to understand and interpret, to articulate 
and organize, to synthesize and universalize his human 
experience. (1966a, p. 221)
"Language, art, religion, science, are various phases in this
process," concludes Cassirer. "In all of them man discovers and
proves a new power— the power to build up a world of his own, an
'ideal' world. Philosophy cannot give up its search for a fundamental
unity in this ideal world" (1966a, p. 228).
In his three-volume The. Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer
refines this theory of man, treating language, myth, and science each
in a separate volume. In the first of these volumes, Cassirer (1953b)
traces the evolution of language and the philosophy of language through
the phases of sensuous expression and intuitive expression to the
expression of conceptual thought, eventually to the expression of the
forms of "pure relation" which constitute logic and science. This
volume also includes a 65-page introduction to Cassirer's philosophy
of symbolic forms by Charles W. Hendel. In this introduction, Hendel
notes the fact that Cassirer unites Kant's (1929) separate treatment
of "form" and regulative "Idea." He quotes Cassirer (1953b):
We have acquired a new foundation for our investigation.
We must go back to "natural" symbolism, to that representa­
tion of consciousness as a whole which is necessarily 
contained or at least projected in every single moment and 
fragment of consciousness, if we wish to understand the 
"artificial" symbols, the "arbitrary" signs which 
consciousness creates in language, art and myth. The 
force and effect of these mediating signs would remain a 
mystery if they were not ultimately rooted :in the original 
spiritual process which belongs to the very essence of 
consciousness. We can understand how a sensuous particular, 
such ns the spoken sound, can become the vehicle of purely 
intellectual meaning, only if we assume that the basic 
function of signification is present and active before the 
individual sign is produced, so that, this producing does 
not create signification, but merely stabilizes it, applies 
it to the particular case. (pp. 105-106)
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Thus, as Hendel himself observes,
Cassirer never forgets, it seems, the insight of Kant in the 
conception of schema. For every schema of understanding is 
a phenomenon of imagination which is at once intellectual 
and sensuous; thanks to the latter aspect there is sense or 
meaning . . . through reference to objects; thanks to the 
former there is agreement with the categories or forms 
through which anything whatever has meaning to the human 
mind. (Cassirer, 1953b, p. 52)
This leads Cassirer to the conclusion that, as he says in 
An Essay on Man, "the facts of science always imply a theoretical, 
which means a symbolic element" (1966a, p. 59); and, "We must refer 
our observations to a system of well-ordered symbols in order to 
make them coherent and interpretable in terms of scientific concepts"
(1966a, p. 217).
"Thus," continues 
condition either of the 
of meaning" (Cassirer, 
in virtue of the formal 
is also the function of 
Hendel concludes:
Hendel, "in every case ' 
knowledge of meaning or 
1953b, p. 53). For art, 
structures of painting, 
the individual style of
symbolic form 









Always some "universe of discourse" is involved in anything 
that has significance. Here then, as it is in organic life, 
the "whole is prior to the parts." Thus "like all the other 
symbolic forms art is not the mere reproduction of a ready­
made, given reality. . . .  It is not an imitation but a 
discovery of reality." (Cassirer, 1953b, p . 53)
For Cassirer, this creative principle, although sh< ’ing itself
most clearly and completely in the forms of art, is a part of all
symbolic form. Hence, myth is a combination of theoretical and
artistic creation. And science is a combination of symbols and
relations, each of which has its basis similarly in a determined
(external.) element and a creative, (internal) symbolic function. This
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creative element of science is most clearly discerned ir the 
hypothesis, which is not merely ."ferred to experimental verification 
but must, first and foremost, be consistent with the form of the 
theory it seeks to enhance.
Thus, for Cassirer, the fundamental distinction to be mad- 
between science and myth lies in the creative aspect of symbolization.
As he says:
Whereas empirical thinking is essentially directed toward 
establishing an unequivocal relation between specific 
"causes" and specific "effects," mythical thinking, even 
where it raises the question of origins as such, has a 
free selection of causes at its disposal. Anything can 
come from anything. (1955, p. A6)
Moreover, science and myth share the same roo"S for Cassirer:
When we compare the emp’rical-scientific and the mythical 
world views, it becomes evident that the contrast between 
them does not reside in their use of entirely different 
categories in contemplating and interpreting reality. It 
is not the quality of these categories but their modality 
which distinguishes myth from empirical-scientific knowledge.
The modes of synthesis which they employ to give the form 
of unity to the sensuous manifold, to imprint a shape on 
disparate contents, disclose a thoroughgoing analogy and 
correspondence. They are the same universal forms of 
intuition and thought which constitute the unity of 
consciousness as such and which accordingly constitute the 
unity of botn the mythical consciousness and the conscious­
ness of pure knowledge. (1955, p. 60)
And since they share the same roots, they must share the same preliminary
In this respect It may be said that each of these forms, 
before: taking on its specific logical form and character, 
must pass through a preliminary mythical stage. (1955, 
p. 60)
"Thus, taken abstractly," says Cassirer, "both the mythical and
the scientific explanations of the world are dominated by the same
kinds of relation: unity and multiplicity, coexistence, contiguity
and succession" (1955, p. 60).*
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What, then, distinguishes the more mature forms of science and 
myth? The beginning of this distinction Cassirer locates in the 
subj ect-obj ect relationship:
In the sphere of pure knowledge, it is true, progress 
consists above all in the differentiation of the principle 
of knowledge from its content, of the knower from the 
known; but mythical consciousness and religious feeling 
embrace a still more fundamental contrast. Here the I is 
oriented not immediately toward the outside world but 
rather toward a personal existence and life that are 
similar to it in kind. Subjectivity has as its correlate 
not some outward thing but rather a "thou" or "he," from 
which on the one hand it distinguishes itself, but with 
which on the other hand it groups itself. This thou or 
he forms the true antithesis which the I requires in order 
to find and define itself. (1955, p. 175)
And it is only in the maturation of the personal identity that
empirical-scientific thinking can come to maturity, as Cassirer 
explains:
In the earliest stages to which we can trace back this 
development we find the feeling of se1f immediately fused 
with a definite mythical-religious feeling of community.
The I feels arid knows itself only insofar as it takes 
itself-as a member of a community, insofar as it sees 
itself grouped with others into the unity of a family, 
a tribe, a social organism. Only in and through this 
social organism does it possess itself; every manifesta­
tion of its own personal existence and life is linked, 
as though by invisible magic ties, with the life of the 
totality around it. This bond can relax only very 
gradually; only gradually can there develop an I inde­
pendent of the surrounding spheres of life. And here 
. . . myth not only accompanies the process but mediates 
and conditions it, constituting one of its most significant, 
and effective motifs. (1955, pp. 175-176)
Thus, for Cassirer, scientific thinking must pass in its develop
ment through a fundamentally mythical stage which "mediates and 
conditions" the evolution of the self (subject) to a point where it 
can begin to determine the forms of "cause" and "effect" in the 
externally perceived non-self.
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The categorical distinction between "I" and "not-l" proves to 
be an essential and constant function of theoretical thinking, 
whereas the manner in which this function is fulfilled , the 
boundary between the "subjective" and "objective" contents 
varies with the level of cognition. For theoretical science, 
the enduring and necessary elements in experience are 
"objective"— but which contents are said to be enduring and 
necessary depends on the general methodological standard 
applied to the experience and on the. level of cognition at 
that time, that is, on the totality of its empirically and 
theoretically assured insights. Seen in this context, the 
way in which we. apply the conceptual opposition of "subjective" 
and "objective" in giving form to the world of experience, in 
constructing nature, appears to be not so much the solution 
to the problem of cognition, as its perfect expression.
(Cassirer, 1953b, pp. 90-91)
The movement of science is thus movement toward an end in which 
all elements are enduring and necessary. In its origin, that 
"preliminary mythic stage" through which it must pass, the predominance 
of elements are neither enduring nor necessary, but largely the 
product of creative imagination, of the subjective element. Here, 
as Cassirer (1953b) points out, .are to be found the first historic
elements of this evolution in the western rational tradition.
2Heraclitus of Ephesus, saying efttcnoaynv cpcwurdv (I searched out.
myself), nevertheless refers to an objective governance when he also
says, ouw epou aAAu too  Aoyou dxouaotvTas opoAoyr.Cv aocpdv c a x t v  ev
itctvxw revetJ (Hearkening not to me but to Logos, :i.t is wise to agree
that one is all). Cassirer interprets such statements in this wav:
For Heraclitus, the logos is the "helmsman of the cosmos."
Like the cosmos which it governs, it was created by god and 
no man, but always was and always will be. Yet though 
Heraclitus still speaks the language of myth, an entirely 
new tone is discernable within it. For the first time 
the mythical view of the cosmic process is clearly and 
consciously confronted by the fundamental, philosophical- 
speculative idea that the universe is subordinate to a 
unified and indivisible, law. (1953b, p. 119)
But for Heraclitus this objective is characterized as one. It is 
composed of neither enduring nor necessary elements. Only in its
oneness does it endure and have its necessity. Anaximander, whose s o l e  remaining fragment of writing begins documented philosophy, terms 
this apxn (causal principle) to a u c t p o v  (the "indefinite”)* saying of 
it, tov 6c n y e v e cu s earuv rots o u a t ,  nai xnv <p$opav cCs x auxa y t v c a S a t  
’xaxa xo XP^“ V ' (From that which is the genesis of existing things, 
also originates their destruction, "according to necessity . . .").
The last three words, precisely those whose authenticity is in least
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phi.logical dispute, speak exactly to Cassirer's point. It is the 
perception of an external necessity which marks the beginning of 
science, the escape from a strictly subjective formulation of the 
world. For Anaximander, this necessity must remain "indefinite." It 
is the role of science to increasingly define the elements of this 
"necessity," and the history of science records precisely that process.
Mythical consciousness stands, on the other hand, at a point 
before this objectification of necessity. To achieve its unity of 
representation, myth cannot therefore rely on an externally perceived 
necessity. Cassirer explains:
The mythical consciousness does not form species by composing 
certain elements into a unity on the basis of immediate 
sensuous similarity or of a mediated causal relation between 
them; the unity of mythical species is rather of a funda­
mentally magical origin. Those elements which belong to one 
and the same field of magical efficacy, which fulfill a 
certain magical function in common, always show a tendency 
to fuse, to become mere manifestations of an underlying 
mythical identity. (1955, p. 181)
A clear example of this is found in totemism, as Cassirer 
notes:
If we apply this principle of mythical concept formation 
to the relation between man and animal, a path opens by 
which we may arrive at an understanding of at least the 
fundamental form of totemism, if not of its special- 
variants and ramifications. For in this relationship 
we find at the outset an essential factor, a central
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condition of mythical unity. The original relation between 
man and animal in primitive thinking is neither exclusively 
practical nor empirical-causa'* • if is a purely magical 
relation. For the primitive view, animals seem more than 
any other beings to be endo^to with magical powers.
(1955, p. 182)'
Levi-Strauss (1962)  ̂ has made an extensive study of this primitive
form of thinking. Quoting Simpson, he notes that "the most basic
postulate of science is that nature itself is orderly." But he
refuses to limit this demand for order to the purely scientific realm:
Or, cette exigence d’ordre est a la base de la pensee que 
nous appelons primitive, mais seulement pour autant qu'elle 
est a la base de toute pensee: car e'est. sous 1'angle des 
proprietes communes que nous accedons plus facilement aux 
formes de pensee qui nous semblent tres etrangeres. (p. 17)
It is on the basis of this similarity that Levi-Strauss can
reach the same conclusion as Cassirer, that science and myth (la pensee
magique) are not contrary but parallel, differing principally in
their modality:
La pensee magique. n'ost pas un debut, tin commencement, une 
ebauche, la partie d'un tout non encore realise; elle forme 
un systenie bien articule; independant, sous cc rapport, de 
cet autre systeme que constituera la science, sauf X'analogic 
formeile qui los rapproche et qui fait du premier une sort 
d'expression nietaphorique du second. Au lieu, done d'opposer 
magic e't science, it vaudralt mieux les mettre en parallele, 
comme deux modes de connaissance, inegaux quant aux resultats 
theoriques et pratiques (car, de ce point dc vue, il est 
vrai que la science reussit mieux que la magie, b.ien que la 
magic preforme la science en ce sens qu'elle aussi reussit 
quelquefois), mais non par le genre d*operations mentales 
qu'elles supposent toutes deux, et qui different moins en 
nature qu'en fonction des types de phenomenes auxquels 
elles s 'appliquent. (1962, p. 21)
Levi-Strauss Is here referring to the mature forms of myth and 
science and, although he refuses to characterize myth as "une. forme 
timide et balbutiante de la science," lie acknowledges that myth 
operates on the basis of limited repertoire. T.t is thus that mythic 
representations such as the totem appear, as Levi-Strauss characterizes
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them, as a sort of "bricolage," the associations in which are founded
not on reason but on imagination.
As to the meaning in such associations, Cassirer says:
Indeed, those totetnic systems that have been most accurately 
observed -',nd studied offer numerous indications that 
originally the choice of a totem animal was by no means 
purely outward and accidental, that the totem is no mere 
"heraldry" but rather that a specific life attitude and 
spiritual attitude is represented and objectified in it.
(1955, p. 186)
And, as he furth-.r notes, "sharp as these differentiations may
gradually become for mythical feeling and consciousness, the idea of
the unity of life persists in them undiminished" (p. 187).
"Accordingly," notes Cassirer, "the conception of Mother Earth,
or tlie corresponding conception of the earth as father, represents a
central and original idea which has shown its power again and again,
from the beliefs of primitive peoples down to the highest productions
of the religious consciousness" (1955, p. 190).
"Thus," concludes Cassirer, "myth expresses all natural reality
in the language of human, social reality and expresses all tinman,
social reality in the language of nature" (1955, p. 192).
"The very existence and form of human society itself requires
such a foundation," writes Cassirer.
For even where we suppose that we have society before us in 
its empirically earliest and most primitive form, it is not 
something originally given but something spiritually condi­
tioned and mediated. All. social existence is rooted in 
concrete forms of community and of the feeling of community.
And the more we succeed in laying bare this root, the more- 
evident it becomes that the primary feeling of community 
never stops at the dividing lines which we posit in our 
highly developed biological class concepts but goes beyond 
them toward the totality of all living things. Long before 
man had knowledge of himself as a separate, species dis­
tinguished by some specific power and singled out from 
nature as a whole by a specific primacy of value he knew 
himself to be a link in the chain of life as a whole,
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within which each individual creature and thing is magically 
connected with the whole, so that a continuous transition, a 
metamorphosis of one being into another, appears not only as 
possible but necessary, as the "natural" form of life itself. 
(1955, p. 194)
Only gradually, in the course of cultural evolution, does human 
consciousness emerge from this fundamental sense of unity, says 
Cassirer, the unmistakable symptom of this passage being that crisis 
in the development of human self-consciousness which gives birth to 
science.
Language is Cassirer's index to this transformation, and his 
example that of Helen Keller. Only when the pure function of 
representation is no longer attached to concrete sensation (in this 
case, touch alone) can the true significance of names, and thus of 
concepts, dawn on the mind. "When the representative function of 
names has thus dawned on a child," writes Cassirer, "his whole inner 
attitude toward reality has changed— a fundamentally new relation 
between subject and object has come into being" (1957, p. 113).
This process has its parallel in the historic, development of
science, says Cassirer, although
even for man it is evident that Ajng after he has learned 
to live in images, long after he has completely implicated 
himself in his self-made image worlds of language, myth and 
art, he must pass through a long development before lie 
acquires the specific consciousness of the image. In the 
beginning he nowhere distinguishes between the pure image 
plane and the causal plane; over and over again, he imputes 
to the sign not a representative function but a definite 
causal function, a character not of signification but of 
efficacy. (1957, p. 112)
This long process, for Cassirer, is thus a universal one. in
consciousness, dictated by the principles of symbolic form itself, 
so that as he spys "ontogeny faithfully reproduces phylogeny."
That is, the same slow process of concrete representation giving rise
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Co abstract conception obtains for the history of the culture as for 
the history of the individual. In either case, "the moment in which 
any particular sensory impression is used symbolically and understood 
as a symbol," says Cassirer, "is always the dawn of a new era . .
(L957, p. 122).
But in this dawning of a new era a new problem has arisen.
Conscious now of the representation, of the named concept, man is no
longer able to unify it immediately with the whole. The sum of
experience has become fragmented; each concept lias become an isolated
datum. Cassirer explains the significance of this:
The logical form of conception, from the standpoint of 
theoretical knowledge, is nothing but a preparation for 
the logical, form of judgement; all judgement, however, 
aims at overcoming t e illusion of singularity which 
adheres to every particular content of consciousness.
The apparently singular fact becomes known, understood 
and conceptually grasped only in so far as it is "subsumed" 
under a general idea, recognized as a "case" of a law or 
as a member of a manifold or series. (1953a, pp. 25-26)
Thus, whereas in mythic consciousness there is no need of judgment,
from the standpoint of science or "theoretical knowledge," judgment is
now the sole means of achieving a unified representation of the whole.
Thus, all the concepts of physics, says Cassirer, "have no other aim
than to transform the 'rhapsody of perceptions,' by which the world
of sense is actually presented to us, into a system, a coherent epitome
of laws" (1953a, p. 27). And the sole means at Che disposal of this
science is the mode of judgment.
Each of man's symbolic forms has a social function for Cassirer.
As he says in The Myth of the State:
In all human activities and in all forms oi human culture 
we find a "unity in the manifold." Art gives us a unity 
of intuition; science gives us a unity of thought; religion 
and myth give us a unity of feeling. Art opens to us the
i
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universe of "living forms"; science shows us a universe of 
laws and principles; religion and myth begin with the aware­
ness of the universality and•fundamental identity of life.
(1946, p. 37)
Cassirer's philosophy of myth is elsewhere treated in Language and 
Myth (Cassirer, 1953a); The Myth of the State (Cassirer, 1946); and 
Symbol, Myth and Culture (Cassirer, 1979). In these works the 
philosophy of myth is applied specifically to respective cultural 
institutions.
Cassirer's philosophy of language is a1so represented in Language 
and Myt’ (Cassirer, 1953a) and in Schilpp (1958).
Cassirer's philosophy of science and concept formation is 
represented in such works as The Problem of Knowledge (Cassirer, 1960); 
Substance and Function (Cassirer, 1953c); and Determinism and 
Indeterminism in Modern Phvsics (Cassirer, 1956).
Additional background on Cassirer's philosophy and its development 
may be gained by reading Kant's (1929) Critique of Pure Reason and 
those works by Cassirer which interpret philosophers figuring 
prominently In his philosophic development; for example, Rousseau,
Kant, Goethi.: Two' Essays (Cassirer, 1947); The Question of Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau (Cassirer, 1954); and The Tndividial and the Cosmos 
in Renaissance Philosophy (Cassirer, 1963).
Also of value in interpreting Cassirer is Langer (1974), whose 
work on the philosophy of language, art, symbol, and myth stems in 
large measure from her study of Cassirer.
It is the principles outlined in the preceding section which are 
carried in chapter 4 to the analysis of Burgess' writings.
CHAPTER III
Development: of the Study
Burgess' Conception of Nature
"Nature," wrote Burgess in 1922, "was the first teacher of the
human race." And he adds that "with this statement no one can take
issue" (1922b, p. 209). These words, along with much of the original.
article in which they appeared, were repeated verbatim in his I960
autobiography. He explains his assertions in this way:
It was not until our prehistoric ancestors began to observe 
the workings of nature and tried to discover the laws 
governing the manifestations which they observed, that they 
began to rise above the animals surrounding them. Every 
•upward step since is traceable directly to increased know­
ledge of the laws governing life, and these laws are the 
laws of nature and have existed from the beginning. Nature 
was the first teacher and still is the universal teacher.
(1922b, I960, p. 209)
Reflecting back to his childhood, however. Burgess recalls a 
different relation to nature:
My first observation in the realm of Nature was completely 
in error. I found it out long, long ago. Nevertheless, 
whales never have looked right since. . . .  It is sometimes 
pleasant, even helpful, to ignore the hard facts of science 
and exact knowledge and instead, gating into the crystal 
globe of imagination, to see red—and-white whales. Who 
shall, sav that wo. are not the better for so doing? (1960,
P- 8)
This statement, made in recalling his first observation of a 
whale— -a 74-foot Blue Whale beached off Cape Cod when be was five 
years old— presents a different side of Burgess' conception of nature.
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as he himself declares:
Though in my writing I s'-rive not to deviate from the prosaic 
facts as Mother Nature presents them, I cannot avoid seeing 
them myself in the enchanted atmosphere in which I made my 
first field observation and whales became red—and—white for 
all time. Looking back through the years, 1 wonder if it 
was not then that- the pattern of my life was set. (1960,
P • 5)
The whale that Burgess observed in 1879 was being "fleshed out" 
when Burgess, a cousin, and his grandfather ascended to the crest of 
the beach dunes to view it. The fleshing knives, as he explains now, 
had exposed in stripes "like a barber's pole" the alternating layers 
of red flesh and white blubber.
This characteristic dichotomy of views--the factual and the 
"enchanted"— permeates all aspects of the Burgess corpus. "Old Dame 
Nature" (later "Old Mother Nature") often intervenes in the early 
stories, and when she does all the creatures in the Green forest. 
Smiling, Pool, and Green Meadow are absolute in their obedience at 
court— unless they have something to hide. In the latter case, they 
soon discover that "you can't: fool Old Mother Nature, and it's of no 
use to try," ns this oft-repeated moral l<t stated. Thus, predominant! 
in the Mother West Wj nd stories, Old Dame (or Mother) Nature serves, 
as Agosta (1983) describes her, as "interlocutor, judge, and general 
mistress' of morals, naming the disruptive crime, accusing the perpetra 
tor (who always attempts to elude her), lecturing him pointedly, and 
then meting out appropriate justice" (p. 78).
Meanwhile, Jimmy Skunk carries around a "little bag of perfume 
which [he] doesn't object to in tlie least, but wl.'.ch makes most- 
people want to hold their noses and run" (Burgess, 1918b, p. 20).
He .ilso is nocturnal, occasionally raids Farmer Brown's henhouse
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(or the nests of Old Gray Goose or Mrs. Quail) in search of eggs,
"never hurries," and is most often to be found wandering down "the 
crooked little path" in search of "fat beetles"— all of which 
characteristics are consonant with skunk biology as described by 
Burt (1972):
The striped skunk comes out from his daytime sleep shortly 
after sundown and starts his search for insects, grubs, 
mice, eggs, berries and a variety of small animal life that 
he may encounter in his wanderings. (p. 75)
Burgess' accuracy with respect to such details is often quite 
precise. For example, Burt describes the effect and use of the skunk's 
scent-spraying medianism:
The skunk is a fearless animal, apparently depending on its 
scent-spraying mechanism for protection. This is used only 
in emergencies. If a person is so unfortunate as to be 
sprayed in the eyes, he need fear no lasting deleterious 
effects. His eves will burn, and he will be blinded 
temporarily, but within a few minutes the tears will have 
washed the eyes clean, and the painful effects, albeit not 
the odor, will have disappeared. (1.972, p. 76)
In comparison, Burgess' version presents the same facts. He
describes Jimmy Skunk’s use of that "little bag of perfume" ns
foilows:
he never uses it, except when he is angry or in danger, but 
when he does use it,- his enemies always turn tail and run.
That is why he is afraid of no one, and why every one
respects Jimmy and his rights. (1918b, p. 20)
And lie describes the effect (when Reddy Fox has overturned the barrel
in which Jimmy is taking his daytime nap) of its use:
He used it now, and lie didn’t waste any time about it. He
threw some of that perfume rigiit in the face of Reddy Fox
before Reddy had a chance to turn and say a word.
"Take that!" snapped Jimmy Skunk. "Perhaps it will 
teach you not to play tricks on your honest neighbors."
Poor Reddy! Some of that perfume got into Ills eyes 
and made them smart dreadfully. In fact, for a little 
while he couldn't see at all. And then the smell of it-was 
so strong that it made him quite sick. He rolled over and
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over on the ground, choking and gasping and rubbing his 
eyes. . . . You see that terrible perfume which Jimmy Skunk 
had thrown at him clung to his red co.it and he knew that he 
couldn't get rid of it, not for a long time anyway. (1918b, 
pp. 20, .24)
For Burgess, nature is thus at once a source of "hard facts," 
to be presented accurately, and a universal overseer, teacher, and 
moral judge to whom all must answer and from whom none can hide the 
truth.
This combination is often compactly presented, as in "Mr. Toad's
Old Suit," from Mother West Wind's Children (Burgess, 1911, 1962).
In this story. Old Mother Nature is coming to inspect "the kingdom of
bid King Bear," and all the little folk "hasten to pay their respects
to Old Mother Nature and to strut about in their fine clothes— all
hut: Mr. Toad." Burgess continues the narrative:
Late in the afternoon, Mr. Toad stopped to rest. He had just 
c leared It Is cabbage patch of the slugs which threatened to 
eat up his crop and he was very tired. Presently he happened 
to look up the road, and who should he see but Old Mother 
Nature herself coming to visit his garden and to fine) out 
why Mr. Toad had not been to pay her his respects.
Suddenly Mr. Toad remembered that he had on his working 
clothes, which were very old, very dirty and very ragged.
For just a minute he didn't know what to do. Then he dived 
under a cabbage leaf and began to pull, of his old suit. But 
the old suit stuck! lie was in such a liurrv and so excited 
that lie couldn't find the buttons. Finally he got his 
trousers off. Then he reached over and got hold of the back 
of his coat and tugged and hauled and finally lie pulled Ills 
old coat off right, over his head just as if it were a shirt.
Mr. Toad gave a great sigh of relief ns he stepped out 
in his new suit, for you remember that he had been wearing 
that new suit underneath the old one all the time.
Mr. load was very well pleased with himself until he 
thought how terribly untidy that ragged old suit looked lying 
on the ground. What should lie do with it? lie couldn't hide 
it in the garden, for Old Mother Nature's eyes were so sharp 
that she would be sure to see it. What: should lie do?
Then Mr. To.:! had a happy thought. Everyone made fun 
of his big mouth. But what was a big mouth for- if not to 
use? He would swallow his old suit! In a flash he dived 
under the cabbage loaf and crammed his old suit into his 
mouth.
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When Old Mother Nature came into the garden, Mr. Toad 
was waiting in the path to receive her. Very fine he looked 
in his new suit, and you would have thought he had been 
waiting all day to receive Old Mother Nature, but for one 
thing— swallow as much and as hard as he would, he couldn't 
get down quite all of his old suit, and a leg of his 
trousers hung out of the corner of his mouth.
Of course Old Mother Nature saw it right away . . . .
(1962, pp. 98-100)
Here again, although a mythic Old Mother Nature remains universal
overseer, what seems at first a bizarre tale turns out to be based
entirely on fact, as Oliver (1955) reports:
Toads are known to shed their skins every three to ten 
days . . . [and theyl habitually eat the shed skin, tearing 
it off with the mouth and swallowing it. (p. 285)
And as Noble (1931) makes evident, again even the subtlest of factors
has been taken into account:
Tin* movements of throat and forclimbs assist in peeling 
off the old skin, that of the limbs being turned inside 
out. (p. 1 AO)
Agosta (1983) notes that "Old Mother West Wind is clearly 
Burgess’s [sic] apprentice work," adding that "certain stories in 
this collection forecast themes, techniques, and intentions which 
characterize his subsequent books" (p. 74). Burgess admits his 
uncertainty at this stage, in mailing the first stories of Old Mother 
West Wind to the publisher:
i think that never have I had less faith in anything, or 
less expectation, than when I mailed these fourteen 
stories. And I don't think I have ever had a more complete 
or happy surprise than was the contract which arrived 
within a week. With it came a letter asking for two more 
stories to fill out the volume. The two stories were 
written, and when they were completed I told the folks at 
home that T had written the very last animal story that was 
in me. (1919d, p. 89)
Burgess describes the origin of these stories:
They were written when my small hoy went to Chicago with his 
grandmother for a visit. Every night while lie was gone I
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wrote and mailed him a story, or some verse. Wanting to 
inculcate in him the love of nature, and also to correct 
certain little faults of his, I created the animal 
characters which have since become so well known. (19l9d, 
p. 89)
Thus, rather th..u an "apprentice work," Burgess at the time of
r
its writing conceived Old Mother West Wind as his first, last, and
only such creation. Soon, however, he was faced with a newspaper
syndicate contract for 312 such stories (a minimum of six stories per
week for one year) and the demand of his publisher for a second volume.
It was these demands which compelled Burgess to evaluate those stories
written at first only for his son, and to seek a technical refinement
of their formative principles. The result of this evaluation Agosta
(1983) describes in this way:
He apparently judged the three explanatory tales ("Why 
Grandfather Frog Has No Tail," "Why Jimmy Skunk Wears 
Stripes," and "How Sammy Jay Was Found Out") in the first 
collection as his most successful, because in them he was 
able to locate his narrative in a primordial, past when 
animals had to learn those lessons important to their own 
and to human survival, as well. Consequently, Burgess 
increased the number of these explanatory tales in his 
second collection. Mother West Wind’s Children, to seven 
out of fifteen stories. (p. 77)
This constitutes a turning point in Burgess' method toward greater 
reliance on natural fact for the starting point of his tales so that 
by 1912, when lie was producing two or more books per year, explanation 
of natural facts and animal characteristics had become thematic. Thus, 
the last four of the eight books of the Mother West Wind series are 
e.nt i rely "explanatory tales," tel ling the child reader "why" (Burgess, 
1915f). "how" (Burgess, 1916e), "when" (Burgess, 1917c), and "where" 
(Burgess, 1918d) such facts came to be.
For example, "When Old Mr. Grouse Got His Snowshoes" (Burgess, 
1917c, 1945) explains the peculiarity of toe bristles in wintering
54
grouse:
Very p r o u d l y  Mrs. Grouse held out one foot for Peter to look 
at. Instead of the slim toes he often had admired Peter saw 
that the bottom of each was covered for its whole length 
with queer-looking, horny little points that prevented the 
foot from sinking way down in the snow as it would have 
done without them. (1945, p. 38)
This peculiarity is described by Bull and Fartand (1977) no less
figuratively:
In winter, the grouse grow comb-like rows of bristles on 
their toes, which serve as snowshoes. (p. 631)
Burgess (1945) continues this story with the explanation that
these snowshoes were given to the "great-great-ever-so-great grandfather'
of Mr. and Mrs. Grouse by Old Mother Nature, adding, however, that
"when spring came. Old Mother Nature came around and took them away,
because he no .longer had need of them; but when next winter came,
she returned them to him" (p. 45). This gift of Old Mother Nature
Burgess' explains as Mother Nature's reward to the grouse for its
patience. In this way. Old Mother Nature remains omniscient overseer,
as in the earlier tales. But in Burgess' start from natural fact
for the purpose of explanation in story form, he has been compelled
in all such stories to designate meaning for these facts in order to
crecite the stories. Furthermore, the designation of such meaning is
always attributed to the authority of the whole.— Old Mother Nature.
Table 1 illustrates this relation of fact and meaning in several cases.
Wright (1979), observing this trend, divides the Mother West Wind
stories into two types:
Tales of the adventures of Green Meadow and Green Forest 
animals and Burgess-created legends, fanciful explanations 
of natural phenomena usually put into the mouths of wise 
creatures such as Grandfather Frog. The stories of the 




11 lusCrations of Burgess' Earlv Relation of Fact: and Meaning
Natural Fact Mother Nature's Reason
Chipmunks have stripes.
Rabbits do not fold 
their forepaws like 
squirrels.
Foxes have red coats.
Blue jays have blue 
fenthers.
Muskrats build their 
homes in water.
Snakes cannot wink.
"There's a stripe for every tear made 
in your coat by the claws of Mr. Bob 
Cat the day you saved Mr. Meadow 
Mouse. They are honor stripes . . ."
"Hereafter, Mr. Rabbit, you and your 
children and your children's children 
will never again be able to sit with 
folded arms until you have learned to 
work."
"And so that you may know who to watch 
out for, from now on never trust the 
one who wears a bright red coat . . ." 
(Punishment for marauding)
"Sammy Jay's fine coat isn't a reward 
for goodness, as is Winsome Blue­
bird's, but is to help the other 
little people of the Green Forest and 
Green Meadows to protect themselves, 
and keep track of Sammy when he is 
sneaking and snooping and looking for 
mischief."
". . . it was a reward for trying to 
be content with his surroundings and 
making the best of them."
". . . you and your children and your 
children's children forever will have 
no eyelids, that all the world may 
know that those who make a wrong use 
of the thingi given them shall have 
them taken away." (Punishment for 
lying)
Note. Drawn from Mother West Wind "Why" Stories (Burgess, 
The key words in Wright's analysis are "fanciful" and
1915f) . 
"legend,"
for whereas Burgess adheres strictly to fact for his starting point in
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these tales, the explanations derived— that is, the meanings— typically 
have little or no basis in the Eacticitv of naturally presented 
phenomena. They are instead moral determinations unequivocally 
injected by Burgess, and as such address in the reader's imagination 
that "enchantment" factor in which, to use his example, "whales become 
red-and-white for all time."
Burgess was aware of the tenuousness of any possible claim that
such conclusions as these tales present could be attributed logically
to the facts in themselves. He explicitly states both his reliance
upon basic facts and his call to imagination:
Wien I began writing animal stories for children it was with 
the sole purpose of teaching the facts about the forms of 
animal life most familiar to American children. T endeavored 
to do this by stimulating the imagination, which is the 
birthright of every child, at the same time holding absolutely 
to the truth so far as the facts concerning the subject of 
each story were concerned. (1922b, p. l[37")
This breach between an absolutely factual base and moral
conclusions derived by imagination, Burgess attempted to narrow by a
further refinement first exemplified in his Bedtime Story-Books,
which began appearing in 1913. In these stories animals are presented
as central figures whose daily lives are livejl out in a systematic
exposition of the natural facts. Here, the animals tell their own
stories, revealing through and in the narrative the facts of their
daily lives. But here also, although distinct moral conclusions are
frequently explicitly stated often in verse form as preface to the
chapters, the plots of these stories are also j designed to guide the
child reader in arriving at these moral conclusions through a
systematic synthesis of the natural facts. In these stories, neither
the fact nor the moral is Burgess' starting point; but his conception
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of their potential relationship which, through the medium of the
story he "unwinds," is actualized in a synthetic unity.
Exemplary of this sort of story is The Adventures of Jimmy Skunk
(Burgess, 1918b). In this book, Jimmy is presented as usual, ambling
along looking for "fat beetles," marauding Farmer Brown's henhouse
in search of eggs, and finding himself trapped in the henhouse when
Farmer Brown's boy comes to feed the. hens. But these facts of skunk
behavior, unlike those of the Mother West Wind series, are not merely
stated and explained. Rather, they are woven systematically into the
plot of a morality play. Here, Peter Rabbit plans a joke on his
archenemy, Reddy Fox, tricking Reddy into a chase which results in
the upsetting of Jimmy Skunk's daytime dormitory, as previously
described. While Reddy is assisting Jimmy in a factual rendering of
the skunk's use » is scent-spraying mechanism, Peter slips into an
unoccupied woodchuck hole, thinking he has gone undetected. He soon
discovers that this is not the case, however, for the old woodchuck
hole, although unoccupied by woodchucks, is now the home of a nest of
Yellow Jackets. Burgess continues:
Poor Peter! What could he do? He didn't dare go out, and 
he'simply couldn't stay where lie was. [He] scrambled to 
his feet and scurried down the long hall, and as he ran, 
he cried "Ouch! Ouch! Oh! Ohoo!" Those sharp little 
lances were very busy, and there was no way of fighting 
back. At the end of the long hall was a snug little 
room, very dark but cool and comfortable. It was just as 
he had hoped; the Yellow Jackets did not follow him down 
there. They had driven him away from their home, which 
was right near the entrance, and they were satisfied.
But what a fix he was in! What a dreadful fix!
He ached and smarted all over. My goodness how lie did 
smart! And to get out he would have to go right past 
the Yellow Jacket home again.
"Oh dear, I wish I had never thought of such a 
joke," moaned Peter, trying in vain to find a comfortable- 
position. "t guess I am served just right." (pp. 31-32)
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And, as Burgess helps the child to conclude, "I rather triink he was, 
don't you?”
Chapter 1 in this series of events opens with the following verse
The Imp of Mischief, woe is me,
Is always busy as a bee.
The full significance of this moral, however, is not revealed to the 
child reader until well into chapter 6, 29 pages later.
Another conspicuous factor in the Bedtime Story-Books is that 
Old Mother Nature rarely appears in person. When she does appear, it 
is typically only in a brief and indirect reference, as the source of 
explanation of a particular animal trait. On the other hand. Farmer 
Brown's Boy, who rarely appears in the Mother West Wind series, now 
appears at some point in nearly all of these stories. At first he is 
feared by all the creatures of the Green Forest and Green Meadow, 
setting traps for them and threatening their lives with his "terrible 
gun." But after a conversion effected in Tommy and the* Wishing Stone 
(Burgess, 1915g), in which Tommy Brown learns through a series of 
metamorphoses what it is like to be an animal in the wild, he becomes 
both animal benefactor and conservationist. Thus in the later 
Bedtime Story-Books, his frequent appearance serves as Burgess' tool 
for expanding the scenes and action in the tales to include the human 
realm in a harmonious light.
Tliis new scheme of relationships reaches its greatest clarity in 
the three series titled Green Meadow (1918-1920), Green Forest (1921- 
1923). and Smiling Pool (1924-1927). These tales, as Agosta (1983) 
notes, "round out the hooks on individual animals" (p. 79), extending 
the basic style and form of the Bedtime Story-Books by 12 more titles 
while confining their principal characters to particular ecosystems,
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all of which now include the human element. Here, Burgess' conception 
of nature is presented in balanced form. Human and animal alike 
participate in the acting out of morality plays whose natural elements 
remain soundly rooted in natural fact.
Each of the books in these series represents a balanced whole. 
Agosta (1983) describes Burgess' aims for these books in this way:
"He hoped in these later works to render each animal in the round, to 
follow it about its pursuits and observe its habits and pastimes"
(p. 79). Key words here are "in the round," for they emphasize the 
unifying ingredient which is explicitly absent but implicitly omni­
present— Old Mother Nature as a whole. In Whitefoot the Wood Mouse 
(Burgess, 1922c), for example, Old Mother Nature is overtly referred 
to but once, as the source of Whitev the Snowy Owl's white coat.
But tnkeVi in sum the .oats of this book represent to the reader 
all the elements of n a t u r e ,  human or animal, "in the round." Food, 
shelter, health and • u r v i v a l ,  reproduction (Wbitefoot has a family), 
friends, and enemies are seen from the particular perspective of 
one creature.
Each of the books in these three later series accomplishes a  
similar, unique perspective on the whole of nature, while leaving 
this whole conspicuous i y absent in the form of a personified entity. 
Each of the elements— what the principal character eats, how it gets 
its food, where it habitually lives, what trials it faces, how it 
overcomes these trials, what enemies and what friends it has, etc. 
is treated in some wav or another in each volume. But the whole 
itself, the sum of those parts, is left to the reader to unify on 
his own. It is nowhere explicitly defined or presented. It is his
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repeated creation of this conception of the whole with and for the 
reader that is the key to understanding Burgess' own conception of 
nature and to recognizing the means by which he conveys it to his 
reader.
Massachusetts Audubon Society President Charles Roth (cited in
Burgess, 1968), in introducing the 1968 reissue ot Mother West Wind's
Children, describes the effect of that recognition on himself:
1 am among the millions for whom Burgess's [sic] key 
unlocked new worlds. Along with others I learned the 
basic facts about the lives of our wild neighbors from 
these stories. I also learned much, quite unwittingly, 
about such human traits as curiosity, kindness, thrift, 
courage and wisdom. Animal nature was the warp of these 
tales, human nature the woof. (p. ix)
For Burgess, nature is neither merely the sum of facts about 
animals and their lives nor merely what is of human relevance in them. 
Nature is an inseparable whole in which both animals and humans 
participate and in which no figure or relation is isolated from the. 
remainder. Moreover, in Burgess' conception of nature as such, are 
to be found examples of every sort of relationship: theft and its 
punishment, honor and its reward, fear and its consequences. And 
these relations, like all others within the whole, cannot he separated 
artificially into strictly human or strictly animal spheres of 
significance. As he says, "There Is little affecting human life which 
has not an analogy in the lives of the lower orders" (1922b, p. 139). 
Thus, the thrift of Happy .Jack Squirrel, exhibited in caching nuts, 
is for Burgess nothing but a lower order of the thrift of a human 
being depositing money in a savings account. T.L is not of primary 
consequence to Burgess that a biologist may experiment and discover 
that caching nuts is not the result of conscious planning on the
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squirrel's part— that thrift is not the squirrel's conscious purpose 
in hiding them. What Burgess conceives as important is that in the 
squirrel's activity there is something which cart have meaning for 
humans. That is, if the squirrel were human (and therefore rational), 
it could recognize that its own habit of caching nuts amounts to 
thrift.
If humans are to learn anything from nature, it must somehow 
display meaning in human terms. Mere facts, given without such 
meaning, only beg Burgess to discover a meaning for them by putting 
them into a meaningful context which represents the wholeness that 
he perceives in nature itself.
Nature is thus for Burgess a unified whole in which the human is 
that part which ascribes meanings to experience. But it is no less 
the whole which provides the raw material for those meanings, the 
"hard facts" as he calls them. And it is this aspect of the whole, 
this inexhaustible provision of the raw material for meanings, coupled 
with the human need for meanings and the human capacity for imagina­
tion, which gives Burgess to call nature the "universal teacher."
Burgess' Conception of His Child Reader
In his role as a storyteller, Burgess also conceives himself as 
a mediator of the child's learning from this "universal teacher." 
"Gradually I realized," he writes, "that I had in my charge an 
instrument for education with undreamed of potentialities. It was in 
the nature of an unsought for and unexpected personal trust" (1960, 
p. 145). Tracing the evolution of Burgess' conception of nature also 
reveals a progressive development of his conception of both this 
"trust" and the child's mind in relation to it.
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He summarizes both his conceived position and his conception of
the nature of the child’s mind in the following passage:
The child of today with plastic mind is the citizen of 
tomorrow with fixed ideas. The time to make sure that 
the ideas are right is before they become fixed. World 
peace and the future of the human race are in the children 
of today. The story is the most acceptable and effective 
way of conveying knowledge and guidance to the child mind 
and establishing them therein. The animal story, because 
of the psychological factor involved, the intuitive feeling 
of superiority on the part of the child, is the most 
effective form of story. Thus I much, much prefer to write 
for children. In so doing I feel a greater sense of real 
power than could ever be mine were I a writer for adults 
or in high political office. (1960, p. 337)
The child's mind is thus, for Burgess, not merely to be charac­
terized by its indeterminacy and potentiality, but also by its 
impressionability. The child's mind is "plastic," and it is this
quality which Burgess addresses in his writing. He seeks creatively 
to shape this "plastic" mind in accord with nature, that unified
whol^ which includes it. And he seeks to do this in both factual and
"enchanted" frames:
I. endeavored to do this by stimulating the imagination, 
which is the birthright of every child, at the same time 
holding absolutely to the truth so far as the facts 
concerning the subject of each story were concerned.
(1922b, p. 137)
His metaphoric descriptions of the child's mind as "plastic" and 
"colorful" signify Burgess' insight that the child is not merely a 
receptacle for facts and ideas, but is himself a whole, shaped progres 
sively by experience. His insight that the child must grow to operate 
in a world of facts leads Burgess to employ facts as his foundation. 
But simultaneously he realizes that the child’s mind, in aid because 
of its indeterminate beginnings, first views these facts in an 
"enchanted atmosphere." This leads him to present raw facts in the
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framework of a fictional story. "The child mind is colorful," he
writes. But, as he continues,
dry facts make no impression. The young mind cannot retair 
that in which it has no interest. Present those facts in 
such a way that the imagination may seize upon them and 
they will be impressed upon the memory forever. (1922b,
* p. 139)
That is, the inexperienced mind, which has no context in which to 
structure factual data, must be given a context. This context is the 
story which Burgess creates around the facts.
And to this understanding Burgess adds the insight that it is 
not the story per se which first interests the child, but the subject 
matter of nature, in which both facts and the child are truly 
imbedded. He writes:
Nature presents an interest which is inherent. It remains 
but to capitalize [sic] this by presenting that which it 
is desired to impart in such form that the imagination 
becomes but a setting for the truth. (1922b, p. 139)
Burgess' stories thus present themselves in the forms defined
earlier. They are either colorful explanations of singular facts,
as in the Mother West Wind stories, or progressive revelations of
several facts related into a plot, as in later tales. And while the
natural setting of the facts provides an "interest which is inherent,"
it. is the story itself with which Burgess "seizes" the child's
imagination and leads him to retain the facts in a new context.
This Burgess conceives as possible because the interest of the child
is fulfilled by virtue of his having been given not only the fact but
the context for it, that is, "imagination has become a setting for
the truth."
Burgess early discovered that this could be achieved by mere 
"fanciful" explanation in the case of his youngest readers. But when
some of these readers began to write to him questioning his veracity, 
he recognized.the need of older children for a broader factual base—  
for a greater degree of proof. His response to this recognition was 
the evident shift from the "explanatory tales" of the Mother West Wind 
series to the revelatory form of the later works. Burgess had. 
realized that the "plastic" mind of the child was already being shaped 
by experience. In order for the child to judge something as true, 
he realized, both the facts and their context in the stories must 
accord with the emerging shape of tht' child's mind. In Burgess' 
words, the ideas of these older readers had begun already to "become 
fixed." Burgess records one of his early encounters with this 
phenomenon, not in relation to a story, but to an accompanying 
'.illustration:
Most diplomatically they pointed out that it is Mr. Quack's 
tail, not Mrs. Quack's, that has two upcurled feathers in 
the tip. I looked up the newspaper with the illustration 
in question. Sure enough, Mrs. Quack sported two tiny 
upturned feathers in her tail. They were so small I had 
not noticed them at all. Thus I .learned anew that no 
error can be so small as to escape the sharp eyes of 
children. (1960, p. 3 2 2 . )
This demand for verity shifted Burgess' emphasis away from 
fictional explanations to fictional plots based on carefully certified 
facts. The result was that the field of imagination, which in the 
Mother West Wind stories often had included the whole of the story 
outside a single axial fact, was shifted to a plot-line upon which 
now several facts were strung in a single story. This shift added a 
new dimension to Burgess' storytelling- approach and to his responsi­
ble! i ty.
Whereas the facts of the Mother West Wind stories had typically 
been readily evident matters of characteristic appearance or
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habit— skunks and chipmunks have stripes, Bald Eagles have white 
heads, muskrats live in water, etc.— those of later stories are 
relatively more complete revelations of habit and relationship.
Thus, the. presentation of these facts and their relations is no longer 
clearly a matter of factuality or of fictionality. That is, the 
distinction between what is purely factual and what is imaginative 
interpretation is no longer clear, even to the discerning child 
reader. Because they constitute natural characteristics and phenomena 
which present themselves decisively, the simple facts of the Mother 
West Wind stories may easily be verified by the child outside the 
context of the stories. Thus, as Krutch (1960) notes, these stories 
"distinguish fact from fancy so clearly that even the childish mind 
knows perfectly which is which" (p. 18). But in the causal relations 
given through the plotting of the later tales, it is not immediately 
evident in terms of possible later experience where the facts end 
and the fiction begins. The new factor in this shift is the form of 
interpretation . Certainly interpretation is present in the Mother 
West Wind stories. But there it is clearly a product of pure 
imagination, indeed may even assume the air of a fairy tale. In 
later writings, however, interpretation takes on the guise not merely 
of imagination, but also of judgment. That is, the elements of 
relation of the facts in the plot are of two sorts. The first are. 
those of factual relation. That otters eat fish, that flying squirrels 
are nocturnal, and that toads travel in the rain are examples of 
such scientifically factual cause and effect relations as Burgess 
weaves into the plots of these later stories. The judgments are those 
of science. The second sort of relation, however, is freely
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interpretive, based not on science or recognized fact, but on 
imagination. These interpretations are Burgess' own, the judgments 
shared with the child. Exemplary of this sort of relation are the 
warnings creatures give one another in dangerous circumstances, the 
cooperation of dissimilar creatures in effecting a task of mutual 
benefit, or the Conscious transmission of information beyond the 
context of immediate time or circumstances. In these cases, Burgess 
is careful in his narrative not to portray creatures as doing things 
they might not otherwise djo. But his interpretation of their reasons 
for doing them are often clearly not in the sphere of scientifically 
recognized causes for such behavior.
For example, in Blacky the Crow (Burgess, 1922a), from the 
Green Forest scries. Blacky opens the hook dining winter, with the 
discovery of eggs in an old nest of Red tail, the Hawk. This is an 
example of type one behavior, and is consistent with crow activity 
in bio Logical terms. Blacky cannot "believe" there, is a nest of eggs 
at tills time of year, however. This is type two behavior, for it 
presupposes that crows can make such analytic judgments, a possibility 
which science would be hard-pressed to verify. Blacky discovers by 
observation, however, that the nest is now being used by Mr. and Mrs. 
booty Owl, as science substantiates, in late winter. Again, these 
are type one relationships and behaviors. But in Ills desire to get 
at the eggs (type one behavior, for crows eat eggs), Blacky schemes 
on other pretenses (type two behavior) to get other crows to drive 
Mrs. booty off the nest so that he can have the eggs to himself. All 
the results in the ensuing scenario are consistent with recognized 
animal behavior, and might easily be observed by a watchful child.
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But the reasons Burgess gives for these behaviors are often of the 
type two sort. In a word, they are anthropomorphic■ This example 
is typical of later works of the revelatory sort.
Early among the Bedtime Story-Books. The Adventures of Jerry 
Muskrat (Burgess 1914a) records a journey shared by Jerry, Billy 
Mink, Little Joe Otter, Grandfather Frog, and Spotty the Turtle 
(occasionally assisted by 01' Mistah Buzzard). This group of 
ecosystem comrades travels upstream to discover why the Smiling Pool 
Is shrinking and the Laughing Brook is no longer laughing. They 
discover a dam built by Jerry's cousin, Paddy the Beaver, and then 
persuade Paddy to make a hole In his own dam In order to restore 
their home.
While it is not unlikely that such creatures would all travel 
upstream during a drought, it cannot be considered factual that a 
turtle and a mink, for example, would confer with a buzzard or that 
either would persuade a beaver to apologetically destroy its own work. 
Here, Burgess technique for synthesizing facts ts still, in its 
formative phase. But by the time of Long legs the Heron (Burgess, 
1927), last of the Smiling Pool books, obviously interpretive plot 
elements are reduced to Peter Rabbit's warning (by thumping his foot) 
to Grandfather Frog that he is about to be speared by Longlegs' beak 
and purposive communications between Peter, Grandfather Frog, and 
Sammy Jay. Other plot elements in this book include a realistic 
tdte-a-tdte between Peter and Reddy Fox, the credible entrapment of 
Longlegs' young offspring, and Tommy Brown's rescue and treatment of 
the young heron's injured leg.
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Burgess justifies the frequent purposive and often rational
conversations between his characters in this way:
The only concessions to pure imagination are the speech put 
in their mouths and the license of the illustrator in 
clothing them. The former is necessary in order to make a 
story, and does not mitigate the truth or in the smallest 
degree offend those seeking the truth because there is 
general recognition of the fact that there is some means 
of communication between animals. The clothing of the 
characters by the illustrator merely serves to more firmly 
establish them as real personalities. (1923c, p. 136)
Biology will concede some form of communication among animals.
But it has not demonstrated any instance in which a turtle and a
buzzard reflectively conversed about the. whereabouts of a beaver dam.
That is, the content of animal conversations is precisely that area
in which Burgess' imaginative interpretation digresses furthest from
recognized fact. Here, and in the reflective actions of the characters,
which are clearly anthropomorphic, are Burgess' principal avenues to
manipulation of plot elements so as to weave them in the desired
direction. If someone is needed to save Happy Jack from Shadow the
Weasel, Tommy Tit the Chickadee needs only to direct Jack's attention
to !■'armor Brown ' s Boy, upon whose shoulder he may take refuge
(Bn !'gess, 1918c , chap. 15). None of the narrative elements in such
a scenario Is subjec t to qu(jstion, hut it would be difficult to
justify the scientific factieity of such altruism on the part of a 
chickadee.
This general trend, then, is visible within the Burgess corpus:
In the first stories of the Mother West Wind series, a preponderance 
of imaginative interpretation is used in each tale to explain a single 
fact or characteristic. Adjusting this scheme on the basis of a 
recognition of the demand of his readership for greater factuality,
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Burgess shifted to the form of synthesis of facts within a plot in 
which he retained a smaLler and less conspicuous measure of inter­
pretive freedom. This shift eventuated, in its most refined state, 
in the production of tales the interpretive elements of which are 
restricted to the rational behavior and speech of the characters, 
which the illustrator depicts in clothing. Otherwise these characters 
behave in a manner consistent with recognized biological interpretation.
Burgess’ Moral Teachings
As Burgess' recognition of the role of judgment in interpretation 
advances, there appear two separate fields of its application to his 
writing. In the first, which may be traced to the accent on facts 
as a foundation, judgments made by science arc presented accurately by 
Burgess, his sole interpretive act being to place them in a context.
This field represents the "fixed" portion of Ills plots. In the other 
field, however, judgment is given directly to the child reader.
Elements in this field are freely created by Burgess, and through the 
mode of their presentation the child is led to determine their 
correctness on the basis of his own judgment. That is, the child 
participates in the interpretive synthesis of facts into a logical 
whole. it is upon this foundation that Burgess rests his moral 
lessons. They are Lessons of relation, and the principal forms the 
relations take are those of community.
These moral lessons, especially in the Mother West Wind books, 
accent primary values— honesty, obedience, compassion, and the like.
In later stories, specific themes are treated— thrift, learning, and 
friendship, for example. Where it .is consistent with biological fact, 
creatures behave in such a way as to demonstrate the moral lesson.
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But where biology has not furnished sufficient information for such 
demonstration, Burgess intervenes with his own creative interpretation. 
The child reader is presented with a base sufficiently factua1 that it 
may serve as a foundation, but he is now led to synthesize through 
judgment the relation of facts given to Burgess' interpretation.
Thus, it is evident that Burgess is not solely concerned with 
reporting facts of nature in a way that they will be retained, but 
also is interested in offering moral guidance to the child. In 
directing the child's synthesis of facts along such lines of meaning, 
Burgess refuses to separate these two avenues of teaching. They 
occur simultaneously. That is, the two faces of each story:— the fact 
and its meaning— are two aspects of the same whole. •
The key to Burgess' justification of this lies in his reasons 
for bringing the animal into the social sphere of the child in the 
first place:
The subjects were lifted above the general classification 
of mere animals, birds and reptiles. They became, at once 
personalities, and as personalities became important and 
interesting characters in the child world. (1923c, p. 135)
The principal function of the animals here, and the function of the
relations in which they participate, both in nature and in the
stories, is that they possess the potential for meaning in the child.
This potential for meaning, unique to human interpretation, is
coincidental with the indeterminate potential of the child's mind
for Burgess. It remains for him to unite them. If the facts of
nature are to be retained, they must for Burgess have a context in
which to "become fixed." These facts must be accurate, for they are
what nature— as created— predictably presents. But the context for
these facts is what nature— as creative— has not yet determined in
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the child. "The time to make sure that the ideas are right is before 
they become fixed," writes Burgess (I960, p. 337). This is as true 
for him with respect to the mere implantation of facts as it is for 
the moral instruction. '.That is right with respect to facts is what 
is accurate. What is right with respect to moral teaching on the 
other hand is a matter of human interpretation.
The child, mind is, for Burgess, a blank slate. To be retained, 
facts must have a meaningful context in the child. And the child, 
as he. continues to assimilate facts, must be guided not only to the 
facts but also through the process of building this context. The 
facts are determined. The context Is freely to be created. Moreover, 
any context of meanings whatever is uniquely constituted in the human 
aspect of nature and thus subject to human guidelines. But in order 
that human Life may accord itself with nature, may remain part of 
the contextual whole which is nature, these meanings must result in 
a community of natural and human spheres. This is Burgess' principal 
aim for the child. This is what he means when he calls "imagination 
but a setting for the truth."
Whether human guidelines be rational, emotional, or artistic, 
their function is to designate meaning to the facts presented in 
experience. Burgess perceives his position in this process as 
presenter of facts and guide in determining meaning. This second 
element of his teaching must, as he recognizes in Iris personification 
of animal characters, begin with what is familiar to the child, what 
belongs to his own social sphere. Thus, fundamental human values are 
his main focus, fundamental animal facts the determinate ground of 
his exemplification. Burgess' masterstroke is his recognition that
72
"there is little affecting human life which has not an analogy in
the lives of the lower orders" (1922b, p. 139). It this realization
which allows him to combine moral, teaching and biological fact with
a minimum of contradiction.
CHAPTER IV
Analysis of Data
In the Mother West Wind stories, Burgess presents "hard facts" 
and at the same time Old Mother Nature as the governing entity who 
determines, explains, and gives meaning to the facts. This presenta­
tion is direct, and the principal source of unification of the 
presentation is Burgess' own imagination, shared with the child through 
the story. Here the child reader is given only the freedom to agree 
or disagree with what is presented. When it is asserted that "you 
can't fool Old Mother Nature, and its of no use to try," why this is 
so is not open to question. Nor is question expected. The story is 
not a means for the child to discover the truth of such a conclusion 
for himself. Instead, lie is simply told the conclusion. These 
stories take the form, "This is so because . . . ." No judgment is 
expected of the child.
On the other hand, the later stories progressively evidence a 
transfer of the. responsibility for conclusive, synthesis to the child 
reader. Here, the direct assertion of a moral, premise is character­
istically given in verse form, separate from the story itself. It is 
the story which is constructed so as to give the reader evidence of 
the. correctness of the explicitly stated moral dictum.
It was Burgess' recognition of the respective, roles of imagination 
and judgment in learning which led him to develop this second technique.
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Evidence of the development is his abandonment of a personified Old 
Mother Nature and his progressive withdrawal from making any direct 
reference to the whole. That is, the responsibility for unifying the 
facts into a representative whole Burgess transfers from himself to 
the child reader.
At the same time, Burgess’ role, becomes increasingly that of 
presenting the facts in such an order and relation that the child's 
natural Inclination to construct such a unified whole— his desire to 
tinderstand--will be enhanced and directed toward the desired conclusion. 
The overt moral becomes a suggestion, a pointer which the child tests 
with the events of the story which follows it. The moral thus amounts 
to a hypothesis which the child validates through the medium of the 
story. And it is this which led Burgess to make the emphatic 
declaration that "always there must be rigid adherence to truth and 
fact." For, as he continues, "it is because the child recognizes that 
the stories are true in all essentials that the lesson is at once 
taken home" (1922b, p. 139). That is, if the hypothesis (i.c., the 
moral lesson) is to be assimilated into the- child's understanding of 
the world, it must have been tested by the child himself against 
verifiable data, must survive empirical test. These verifiable 
data are those presented by nature itself, not in the guise of a 
personified overseer. Thus, it is that real nature, presented 
accurately, replaces Old Mother Nature, presented figuratively.
By contradistinction, in the Mother West Wind series, Old Mother 
(or Dame) Nature presents both the fact and the conclusion: "Jimmy 
Skunk, as everybody knows, wears a striped suit," writes Burgess 
(1910, p. 36), proposing that it was not always so and that skunks
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were originally entirely black. But, when Jimmy has stolen all of 
Mrs. Grouse's eggs and then denied the deed. Old Dame Nature steps 
onto the scene and, as Burgess continues, explains her reason for 
giving him stripes:
"Jimmy Skunk," said Old Dame Nature, "because your handsome 
black coa.t of which are so proud has made it possible 
for you to move abou ..t the night without being seen, and 
because we can no longer trust you upon your honor, hence­
forth you and your descendants shall wear a striped coat, 
which is the sign that you cannot be trusted. Your coat 
hereafter shall be black and white, so that when you move, 
about in the night you will always be visible. (p. 36)
However true it may be that stripes are an identification
mechanism for nocturnal skunks, in attributing their origin and
significance to the authority of a fictional and personified Old Dame
Nature, Burgess has diverted the child away from any factual basis
for a moral lesson. The moral lesson thus presented, one about
stealing and lying, is therefore founded on a fictional, an
"enchanted" basis.
It is evident that Burgess intends to present such a moral lesson 
in tills story, for Old Dame Nature progressively unravels the evidence, 
accounting for the nocturnal whereabouts of all the creatures of 
Green Meadow and Green Forest, at last presenting this evidence in a 
detailed corpus delicti to all assembled at tiie Great Pine. Old Dame 
Nature's resulting judgment, given previously, is clearly one against 
stealing and lying, li both of which crimes Jimmy has been caught 
and proven guilty. Authorship for this judgment rests entirely with 
Old Dame Nature, not vlth the child.
This manner of presentation characterizes all the early "explana­
tory" tales: A single fact is presented, and the remainder of the 
story is a fictional account of the origin and imagined reason for
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the fact. Any moral lesson is given within this fictional frame.
In the later stories, however, it is the moral that is presented 
first to the reader; and the facts become the evidence which supports 
the moral. For example, in Little Joe Otter (Burgess, 1925, 1953), 
one of Little Joe's children is admonished by his father not to eat 
any dead fish because there are traps about the brook which are 
baited with them. The young otter loses a toe in the process of 
discovering— and evidencing to the child reader— the validity of the 
moral g'ven at the beginning:
Youth too often scorns advice
And in the end must pay the price. (1953, p. 152)
The missing element in this example, as in other of the later 
tales, is the explicit judgment and jurisdiction of Old Dame Nature. 
The judgment is the child's to make for himself. It Ls Burgess' 
recognition of the need to transfer this responsibility which results 
in the aforementioned shift from "explanatory tale" to "morality 
p l a v . "
Another distinctive element in the Mother West Wind series is the 
frequency of assemblies of all characters. In "How Sammy Jay Was 
Found Out" (Burgess, 1910), Old Mother West Wind herself convenes a 
meeting of all the creatures In order to discover who has stolen 
Happy Jack Squirrel's hidden nuts. Friend and foe alike gather at the 
foot: of the Lone Pine for a midnight, feast in "Why Reddy Fox Has No 
Friends" (Burgess, 1911). Such meetings invariably include all 
creatures from the Burgess cast of characters (except Farmer Brown's 
Boy), even archenemies. Thus, such meetings represent concretely to 
the. child not only the totality of Mother Nature's realm, but its
overal 1 'community.
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These distinctive gatherings do not occur in either the 
Bedtime Storv-Books or later tales. Here, instead, the cause and 
effect relationship of predation and evasion is kept strictly intact. 
In making the change of approach from fact-explanation to hypothesis- 
synthesis Burgess has recognized that his child reader perceives the 
incredibility of any peaceful meeting between fox and rabbit or heron 
and frog, and he has made the necessary adjustment in style. But 
the significance of this recognition reaches beyond this single 
adjustment, for it also entails for Burgess a recognition of the 
importance of judgment in the child's reaction to' all aspects of the 
stories. Thus, if a shift from explanation to progressive revelation 
marks a significant shift of emphasis in method, the shift from an 
explicitly given, "enchanted" representation of the whole of nature 
to an implicit, unexpressed telos for factual synthesis represents a 
similar change in Burgess' conception of the child reader. The 
Mother West Wind stories represent nature to the child in a unified 
and concrete mythic form, whereas the later works represent nature 
in a theoretic and preliminary empirical-scientific form.
This discovery opens up an entirely new avenue for examination 
of Burgess' work, for it shifts the focus of analysis from the 
secondary issues of the validity of his "essential facts," the 
relativity of his morals, and the quality of his literary style to 
the more fundamental need of first examining the essential form of
their presentation and its relation to his aims in writing.
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Burgess in the Mythic Form—
Old Mother West Wind
Cassirer has defined those elements necessary for the classifica­
tion of a representation as mythic:
Myth . . . lives in a world of pure forms which it looks upon 
as thoroughly objective, indeed as objectivity pure and 
simple. But its relation to this world discloses no sign of 
that decisive "crisis" with which empirical and conceptual 
knowledge begin. . . . Here the nuances of significance and 
value which knowledge creates in its concept of the object, 
which enable it to distinguish different spheres of objects 
and to draw a line between the w c ’ld of truth and the world 
of appearance, are utterly lacking. . . . Instead of the 
dialectical movement of thought, in which every given 
particular is linked with other particulars in a series and 
thus ultimately subordinated to a general law and process, 
we have here a mere subjection to the impression itself and 
its momentary "presence." (195.5, p. 35)
Myth is thus, first of all, a world without the sense of a progression
of cause and effect relations. It is, as Levi-Bruh.1. (1926) describes
it, a "prelogical" world; and the mind which perceives it is a
"prelogical" mind. Therefore, as Cassirer writes:
All the sanctity of mythical being goes back ultimately 
to the sanctity of the origin. It does not adhere 
immediately to the content of the given but to its coming 
into being, not to its qualities and properties but to 
its genesis in the past. . . .  A conspicuous trait of 
nature, a striking characteristic of a thing or species,
:is held to be "explained" as soon as it is linked with a 
unique event in the past, which discloses its mythical 
generation. The mythical tales of all times and people 
are rich in concrete examples of this kind of explanation.
(1955, p. 105)
These observations, coupled with Cassirer's recognition that 
these are universal principles of the development of consciousness—  
individual or cultural— open up the possibility of explaining 
Burgess' writings in terms of myth. Accordingly, Agosta notes of 
Burgess' Mother West: Wind series:
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Almost all of the stories posit an original golden age, as 
is clear in "How Howler the Wolf Got His Name," a tale from 
the Mother West Wind "How" Stories: "With Mr. Wolf, as with 
all the other animals, life was an easy matter at first.
There was plenty to eat, and everybody was on good terms 
with everybody else. But there came a time, as you know, 
when food became scarce. It was then that the big learned 
to hunt the small, and fear was born into the world."
(1983, p. 78)
Cassirer says of the mythic sense of time:
For myth time does not take the form of a mere relation, 
in which the factors of present, past, and future are 
persistently shifting and interchanging; here, on the 
contrary, a rigid barrier divides the empirical present 
from the mythical origin and gives to each its own 
inalienable "character." Thus it is understandable that 
the mythical consciousness . . . has sometimes been 
called a timeless consciousness. (1955, p. 106)
This parallels Burgess' statement that "all my familiar 
characters of the Green Forest, the Green Meadows, the Old Pasture 
and the Smiling Pool are of necessity ageless" (1960, p. 223).
Thus, although in the "empirical present" skunks and chipmunks have 
stripes, it is Ln a timeless "mythical origin" that Burgess' 
explanation of their existence is found.
The possibility of this "ageless" presentation by Burgess lies 
in tlie fact that, as Cassirer says, "[mythic] consciousness is bound 
by its mere facticity; it possesses neither the impulsion nor the 
means to correct or criticize what is given here and now, to limit its 
objectivity by measuring it against something not given, something 
past: or future" (1955, pp. 35-36). And thus, as he further notes, 
"anything can come from anything" (1955, p. 46), so that any explana­
tion of the origin of stripes, characteristics, or animal habits is 
sufficient to the. mythic mind.
This is not to say that the evident stripes of a skunk are not 
experienced in the same way as by the empirical-scientific mind,
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but that the explanation of their origin, their meaning, need not be 
based on cause and effect relation. As I*evi-Bruhl states it, 
"primitives see with eyes like ours, but they do not perceive with 
the same minds" (1926, p. 44). This is equally true of the child 
mind toward which Burgess directs his stories in the mythic form.
Levi—Bruhl’s examination of the "primitive" or mythic mind 
concludes, in accord with Cassirer, that the key to understanding 
this difference lies in what he calls "the law of participation." 
!IerL not only can anything come from anything, but anything can 
actually be anything through "participation which is directly 
represented and actually felt," says Levt-Bruhl, adding that from 
this "it is an easy transition to the belief, which is so common in 
undeveloped races, in a relationship between men and animals" (1926, 
p. 93).
This form of consciousness therefore precedes any clear objec­
tification of the self. Accordingly, the self can likewise actually 
be anything within the context of mythic unity. In fact, for 
Cassirer, the first objectifications of the mythic mind are as if 
"hybrids" of objectivity and subjectivity:
Subjectivity has as its correlate not some, outward thing 
but rather a "thou" or "he,'.' from which on the one hand 
it distinguishes itself, but with which on the other hand 
It groups itself. . . . in the earliest stages to which 
wc; can trace hack this development we find the. feeling of 
self immediately fused with a definite mythical-religious 
feeling of community. (1955, p. 175)
In its essence, the mythic consciousness, rather than merely 
sensing an objective and magical world of "pare forms" as somehow 
apart from itself, actually participates in that world as a part of
i tso l f As these quasi-objective forms change, of necessity, with
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experience, the very self of the mythic consciousness changes. In a
word, the mythic mind is "plastic."
Tliis is the "plastic" mind which Burgess addresses in his
morally c«»'iented tales of animal characteristics. It is for this
reason that nature is presented as a totality and a community in
these tales. It is only in community that the "plastic" consciousness
of myth perceives itself as being. As Cassirer explains:
Only in and through this social organism does [the mythic 
mind] possess itself; every manifestation of its own 
personal existence and life is linked, as though by 
invisible magic ties, with the life of the total! / 
around it. (1955, p. 175)
Moreover, at the same time as this "plastic" mind is progressively 
shaped by its experience, the life of the totality around it is also 
taking shape in what will become the objective form. Long before
that "decisive 
a sense of the 
explains this:
crisis," as Cassirer calls it, there must-first evolve 
separateness of animal and human spheres. Cassirer
Only by a progressive concentration, only by a gradual 
narrowing of that universal life feeling in which myth 
originates, does it gradually arrive at the specifically 
human feeling of community. In the early stages of thfe 
mythical world view there is as yet no sharp boundary 
separating man from the totality of living things, from 
the world of animals and plants; particularly in totemism 
the kinship between man and animal . . .  is taken by no 
means in a figurative but in a strictly literal sense.
In liis actions and institutions, in his whole form and 
manner of life, man feels himself to be one. with the 
animal. (1955, p. 179)
The progression of the sense of community thus moves first from 
that of a community of the whole, including animals, to a sense of 
the. particular community that is human. It is from this that 
progressively and inexorably there dawns the. conceptual distinction 
between "human" and "animal." Bound by the universal laws of the
form of consciousness, the mind gradually loses the sense of the 
community of all Life only to seek a reunification, magically through 
"the law of participation." This is the fundamental principle of 
the phenomenon called totemism, and compulsion for unification is 
what drives it. This is the source of Burgess' premise that interest 
in animals is inherent and universal, one which Burgess terms 
"instinctive.” As he says, "this interest has persisted . . . and 
probably a.lw.vs will persist" (1922b, p. 137). Animals, in their 
separate status as such, arc now for the first time a separate, an 
objective, and therefore a fixed fact, but likewise, as Cassirer 
says, are "valid not insofar as they reproduce a given rigid being 
but insofar as they comprise a project for possible postulations of 
uni tv" (1 957, p. A76). Viewed in this light, the Mother West Wind 
stories are to be classed as toteniic postulations of the community of 
U f e .
"Whore Little Chief Learned to Make Hay" (Burgess, 1918d) 
demonstrates these principles. Little Chief, a pika living in the v 
mountainous west, is the subject of this story, which is told to 
Peter Rabbit by Old Man Coyote. Since Old Man Coyote is Burgess' 
principal emissary from the Par West, and since Burgess' principal 
exemplar of curiosity is Peter Rabbit, the fact that they are 
enemies is subrated to the fact that Old Man Coyote knows all about 
pikas. Here is the principle that anything can participate in 
any tiling.
Of course, [said Old Man Covotel Little Ciiief's father 
taught him how to make hay, and his father's father 
taught him, and so on way back to the days when the world 
was young and Old Mother Mature made the first Pika or 
Coney, whichever you please to call him, and set him free 
on a great mountain to prove, whether he was worthy to
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live or was so helpless that there was no place for him in 
the Great World. (p. 67)
Here is the mythic origin in a timeless past "when the world was 
young." In the remaining story. Little Chief learns to dry "hay" in 
the? sun and thus to pass the knowhow on to his children and his 
children's children. Burgess' tool of employing the metaphor "hay" 
to describe the pika's habit of drying vegetation constitutes for 
his reader a "postulation" of the unity of life between pika and 
human. The pika is a totem for haymaking and its value in foresight 
and planning. The child reader thus not only learns a fact of 
animal life, but the community of life is reassured and a moral lesson 
is taught at a single stroke.
These totemic postulations of the unity of life are found 
throughout the explanatory tales of the Mother West Wind series: 
Animals possess traits or habits whose, origin is in a timeless past. 
They are traits given in human terms, thus effecting the sense of 
community. They are traits which exemplify a human or moral code 
of behavior by which Burgess seeks to shape the "plastic" mind.
The principal function of the Mother West Wind stories is thus 
to guide the self of the child, to shape it in accord with nature, 
as Lt emerges in its own right as separate from nature, yet related 
to it:. This inevitable emergence, which will be that "decisive 
crisis" which marks the beginning of reason and judgment in the 
child, marks the beginning of another phase in Burgess' presentation 
of nature to the child. No longer entirely mythic, this presentation 
also expects judgment on the part of. the child. These stories are 
presented in the empirical-scientific, form.
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Burgess in the Empirical-Scientific 
Form— Later Works
If the principal objective of the explanatory tales is the 
shaping of the child's conception of self, the principal objective 
of the revelatory, or empirical-scientific, form of the later tales 
is that of shaping the child's conception of the objective world— the 
non-self. At some point in the development of the relation of subject 
and object, the object inevitably comes to be perceived as functioning 
on its own and by a separate causal principle. The "magic ties" 
which have heretofore linked it in community with the self are here­
after broken. To understand, to postulate a unity of cause and to 
verify it, now requires the mode of judgment. "In the beginning," 
writes Cassirer,
[man] nowhere distinguishes between the pure image plane 
and the causal plane; over and over again, he imputes to 
the sign not a representative function but a definite 
causal function, a character not of signification, but 
of efficacy. (1957, p. 112)
That is, for a long while the child participates in an absolute
community with the animal world as presented by Burgess. As the
child's ability to distinguish between separate causal agencies in
the objective— as the self and the non-self emerge as separate— the
compulsion for unification, the need to understand this separateness,
must base itself not upon "magic ties" but upon a judgment about their
causal unity. Here, the community of animal and human spheres must
be proved. Community, to be achieved, must take the shape of a
Logical relation. Cassirer characterizes this new mode in this way:
Transcending objective time and experienced time, [the 
mind] must seize upon a permanent and stable content and 
posit it as identical with its self. Identifications of 
this kind— even if they do no more than establish and
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postulate purely sensuous qualities— contain the germ and 
beginning of every form of concept formation. (1957, p. 115)
Thus, long before the actual recognition that the objective
"other" is a representation, a collective artifact of experience, the
child's mind perceives a certain objective necessity in the animal
sphere. It is in his recognition that animals are of necessity
different, that he is somehow causally separate from the animal, that
the child at once distinguishes animal and human spheres and demands
stable "proof" of their community. Here is the basis of Burgess'
claim that children sense their inherent superiority to animals:
Unable to understand the principles which determine the "fixed"
nature of the objective, the child in recognizing his own creative
freedom senses that he is "superior." Animals must "prove" their
community with his.
At the same time, the demand for community, for unity in 
experience, compels the child to seek for such proof. Thus, his 
interest in animals is sustained. In light of the child's creative 
freedom, the field of this proof is entirely open. Burgess recognizes 
that the animal story is a "means for conveying information of all 
kinds," and that in this conveyance it is possible to offer moral 
guidance as wel . Now in possession of the interpretive freedom 
inherent in imagination, the child himself assumes Burgess' role as 
synthesizer of facts. Eager for proof, his mind "seizes upon" the 
facts and, under Burgess' guidance, attempts to discover a logical 
relation for them— to establish their community.
The quest for proof in this form requires a starting point. 
Burgess offers this in the form of a moral hypothesis which, in 
virtue of its human relevance, the child seeks to prove in the animal
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sphere. Burgess then provides examples "from the lower orders" 
which are analogical to human life,’ thus fostering the child's 
discovery of the community of nature in logical— in empirical- , 
scientific— terms. It is thus that unity is restored in experience, 
"imagination becomes a setting for the truth," and the child's approach 
to the objective realm takes shape in the form of scientific inquiry. 
While this is accomplished, Burgess has likewise fostered the 
acceptance of the moral hypothesis.
It is therefore evident that the issue of reconciling factual 
animal nature and moral instruction is, for Burgess, subordinate to 
the establishment of the fundamental form of reconciliation itself.
This is the form of science per se. As Bronowski (1956) says,
"Science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses. . . . The 
scientist looks for order in the appearances of nature by exploring 
such likenesses . . . finds order and meaning in our experience"
(p. 23). Science seeks to reconcile experience into a consistent 
whole.
Before, this is possible, the child must have firmly established 
a relation with the objective, that is, must have established the 
subject-object relationship itself, by and through which science 
does anything whatever. Only then can he establish the essential form 
of scientific inquiry: hypothesis, verification, interpretation, and 
synthesis.
It is these tasks, not merely the delivery of moral lessons, 
the establishment of factual knowledge, or the exposition of a proper 
linguistic style, which are Burgess' principal objectives in writing.
He is teaching neither facts nor morals, but children.
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From this assessment, it is now possible to make a definitive 
examination of Burgess' writing from the standpoint of education.
What Burgess Means by 
"Essential Facts’'
The elements in Burgess' stories which he terms "facts" are 
those elements which Burgess knows the child will encounter outside, 
the context of the stories. These elements must therefore be 
consistent with that experience. They must be reported accurately 
if the content of the stories is to be retained and accepted as true.
Every story involving such facts must be internally consistent. 
That is, the fact must form some link with the story so that it 
becomes, as it were, an "index" to the story and its meaning. This 
internal relation may be a mythic relation, based entirely on 
imagination— as, for example, that Old Mr. Toad eats his skin in 
order to .present himself well-clad to Old Mother Nature. Fact and 
imagination must form a coherent whole. As Burgess says, "dry facts 
make no impression."
Facts are, for Burgess, the determined portion of his stories. 
They acknowledge human conceptual conventions which Burgess recognizes 
will form the foundation of the child’s concept world. Accordingly, 
Burgess does not tamper with their facticity, with their determinate 
status as conceptual conventions.
In this way, Burgess employs facts as veridical referents to 
all past and future experiences the child may have. These referents 
carry the inferential meaning given them in the context of the stories 
he presents, but link this meaning -to other experience. Facts thus 
become the structural pivots for the child's future concept formation.
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The relative proportion of facticity and creative imagination 
in the construction of the stories is a function of Burgess’ conception 
of the level of expression of the child's subject-object development. 
Where the child reader has not yet conceptually defined his "self," 
Burgess addresses him in mythic form, and the basis in fact is a 
single index. These are the Mother West Wind, or "explanatory" tales. 
The predominant plot elements in these stories are those of the 
imagined meaning of the fact. That is, the interpretation of the fact 
is predominantly fictional. Here, Burgess’ interpretive freedom Is 
greatest, and hence the facticity of the story is least.
In later works, as previously described, the basis in facticity 
is enlarged proportionately as the child’s subject-object development 
has increased. Burgess' interpretive freedom is least, and is in 
fact shared in measure with the reader by suggestion.
The purpose of facts in Burgess' stories is to provide a 
veridical foundation for the child's future learning. As the child's 
growth evidences an increased need for veridicility, Burgess responds 
with an increase in this factual base.
The Role of Creativity in 
Burgess' Stories
Burgess conceives nature as a unified whole. He likewise 
recognizes that any representation of nature, mythic or scientific, 
aims at representation of this wholeness. The function of creativity 
in Burgess' stories is to effect this representation through a 
unification of the determinate factual base. In the case of mythic 
representation, this creative aspect, beyond the single foundational 
fact, is absolute. It takes the form of Burgess' imagination, the
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guiding principle of which is interpretation. Although Burgess 
freely involves moral teaching in his interpretation, the fundamental 
purpose of the process is, as Cassirer describes the role of myth, to 
"accompany and mediate and condition" the development of the concept 
of self within the child's sphere of experience (1955, p. 176).
This is the source of Burgess' authority for moral teaching, for 
while the mode of creative imagination cultures the child's develop­
ment of self-concept, this modality must have a content. The content 
Burgess creatively chooses is that of moral instruction. Although 
his principal aim is a singular one, his secondary aims are numerous. 
These secondary aims are based in the strictly human sphere of 
interpretation, and thus presage the child's own creative imagination, 
to be employed once the subject-object "crisis" has occurred. This 
is what Burgess means when he says that the child's mind is "plastic," 
for it is to be formed both in terms of its subjective sphere (as 
creative) and in its objective sphere (as created). Burgess' 
creative interpretations seek at once to culture both spheres, the 
former bv example, and the latter by "accompanying, mediating and 
conditioning" its content. Because the subject-object distinction 
is, in the mythic stage of development, not yet absolute, this is 
accomplished at a single stroke.
The Free and the Determined in 
Burgess' Stories
The answer to the question of what is free, and what is determined 
in Burgess' interpretation of nature rests upon the relation of 
facticity and creativity. As Cassirer has pointed out:
There is no such thing as sheer facticity, as an external
and immutable datum: on the. contrary, what we call a fact
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must; always be theoretically oriented in some way, must be 
seen in reference to a definite conceptual system, which 
implicitly determines it. (1957, p. 409)
Seen from this perspective, the answer to the question is that 
all is free. Theoretically speaking, this is an epistemological 
question of long-standing dispute. But for Burgess, the answer is a 
practical one. Some facts, however interpretive may be their ultimate 
origins, are sufficiently rooted in convention as to be incontro­
vertible. It is these which Burgess takes to be determined in and by 
nature. These are the "hard facts" of his description. They form the 
objective foundation of his work.
There are two areas of his work which remain free in the sense' 
that interpretation is open to absolute creative imagination. These 
two areas are Burgess' own mind in the production of his writings, 
and the child's mind in its response to those writings. That is, the 
only determinate point of necessity shared by Burgess and the child 
is the field of "hard facts."
Burgess' response to this interpretive freedom is to select moral 
teaching as the mode of his interpretation, ami to structure the 
relation of the facts so as to give evidence of the truth of the moral 
teaching. In this way, he is not only creating the story, but he is 
also creating the child's image-world on a morally sound base. This 
defines Burgess' conception of the role of a teacher. He not only 
interprets the subject, but he creates a relationship of that subject 
with and in the child. Both of these processes are "free," and assume 
a status as "determined" only insofar as they are actualized in 




The role of teacher is therefore, for Burgess, primarily a 
creative role. More than a mere presenter of facts, Burgess is a 
guide to understanding the meaning of facts. In the earliest phase, 
the meaning of facts for the child is purely that they represent 
objectivity. At this stage, the sole purpose of teaching is to 
cultivate the development of the subject-object relationship in such 
a way that the greatest potential for future acquisition and inter­
pretation of facts is sustained. In confirming the "hard facts" of
o
this development, Burgess assures that future Interpretation will not 
require the rectification of error. Through a presentation of such 
facts in a mythic frame, the creative potential of the child is 
reassured that unification (and eventually understanding) is possible 
and the natural reward of interest.
As the subject-object relationship becomes increasingly determined 
in the child, the role, of the teacher shifts to one of fostering 
judgment. interest takes the form of belief that judgment will, 
provide a meaningful synthesis of facts, that facts are of value in 
such a synthesis. In this phase, Burgess shifts his emphasis to that 
of suggesting potential forms of relationship of the facts presented.
If teaching in the mythic phase of development lias been proper, 
the potential for a logical relation of facts in the objective will 
already have been shaped into the very form of the child's concept of 
the objective sphere. If teaching in the second phase (the empirical- 
scientific phase of Burgess) has been proper, the process of creatively 
questioning the facts (hypothesizing) will be a part of the shape of
child mind in all future learning.
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Burgess' principal role as teacher is to provide the child with 
a maximal ability to continue learning for himself and with the tools 
for doing so.
The Relationship of Potentiality.
Creativity, and Facts
Potentiality characterizes the essential form, of the child's mind
in its indeterminate beginnings. In contradistinction, facts are such
by virtue of their absolute determinacy. Creativity is the determining
■»»
link between these polar elements. Its mode is that of imagination.
Burgess' role as teacher is to introduce his child reader to 
facts which he is confident the child will be able elsewhere to 
encounter, and also to guide the child in creatively determining his 
own relation to the facts. In this process, the fact must remain 
determinate; and in its progression from potentiality to determinate 
status, the child's mind increasingly must assume authorship of 
creativity in determining this relationship.
Tn its earliest phase, Burgess' guidance takes the form of pure 
demonstration. Here are the Mother West Wind, or "explanatory" tales, 
which link the determinate fact to the indeterminate child mind 
through Burgess' own imagination. The child's Interest is a function 
of his mind's natural demand for community with the animal subject of 
the story. It is, as Burgess says, "inherent."
With tiie determinate status of the fact of objectivity, creativity 
must assume the dual role of imagination and judgment, for the mind's 
relation to the objective fact is now a matter of logical relation—  
of proof. Two elements of relation now figure into the process: 
those of pure facticity (logical necessity) and those of the child's
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own interpretation (hypothetic necessity). Burgess presents the 
possibility for both of these in the plot-lines of his stories. In 
the case of logical necessity, Burgess-is careful to present only 
particular* elements for synthesis and thus guides the child reader 
to a desired conclusion. In the case of hypothetical necessity,
Burgess' guidance takes the form of suggestion.
In both cases, the child's interest remains a function of his 
demand for community (now synthetic unity); but it is now founded on 
Che belief that facts given and their relations (logical or hypothetical) 
are a necessary part of the structure, of that community. Interest has 
thus progressed from Che stage of pure imagination -to one of rational 
demand for proof. Proof is derived by analysis (confirmed .logical 
necessity) and synthesis (confirmed hypothetical necessity).
When Burgess terms imagination "but a setting for the truth"
(1922b, p. L39), it is with the recognition that "truth" is any 
internally consistent representative whole which is based on natural 
fact. This, then, is the source of his demand for "strict adherence 
to die truth" in biological terms. For whereas Burgess' interpretation 
of facts in mythic form is by demonstration., based on imagination, the 
child's own interpretation must progressively be based on.conventional 
logical, grounds— that is, on scientific truth— as he takes command 
of his own responsibility for structuring his "image-world." Thus, 
long after the "red-and-white whale" of youthful interpretation is 
subrated Co the. factual whale of biological truth, the same fundamental 
facts will unite these views in a structural whole. It is in this k
continuing reference, throughout life, to the singular facts as 
first presented, and in their status as indices to the moral teachings
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with whigh they have been so intimately associated, that these facts 
at once retain their facticity and their human meaning. It is in the 
breadth of the ground between this "enchanted" original vision and the 
factual truth of the repeatedly verified biological datum that 
creative vision is sustained in the adult life. As Burgess says, 
"Vision is but imagination governed by logic" (1924b, p. 49). Thus, 
the early "enchanted" presentation, rather than endangering a later 
discovery of the truth, is actually the means for assuring future 
scientific creativity. As facts are assimilated into the child's 
"image-world," a maximum of continued creative imagination is assured 
at the expense of a minimum of potentiality. Without endangering the 
facticity of facts, Burgess is a teacher of scientific vision.
22'e Ho la t ion ship of Symbolization,
Interest, and Imagination
Interest occurs only in the absence of a unified representation 
of experience. It is the spur to imagination. Imagination is a non- 
veridical unification of experience in representation. In strictest 
terms, imagination is the construction, in the absence of logical 
necessity, of a unified image which represents experience and gives 
it potential meaning. The result is a symbol of experience, and the 
process by which imagination produces the symbol is termed symboliza­
tion .
In Burgess’ writing, symbolization takes two forms: the mythic, 
based entirely on imagination; and the empirical-scientific, based on 
both imagination and judgment. In the case of mythic symbolization, 
the unified representation is a fiction whose veridicality is not a 
matter of concern. In the case of empirical-scientific symbolization,
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the unified representation is a product of logical synthesis. In 
this second case, imagination takes the form of hypothesis. Judgment 
reconciles hypothesis and fact in a veridical unification, that is, 
a veridical symbol. Empirical-scientific symbolization is neither 
possible nor necessary until the mind has developed the conceptual 
distinction of subject and object.
Symbolization and Understanding
Understanding is a function only of logical relation. Strictly
speaking, the mythic mind does not "understand," for understanding
bears the distinctive mark of logical necessity; and the mythic mind
makes no distinctions that may in the strictest sense be termed
logical. The symbolization which pertains directly to understanding
is empirical-scientific symbolization. Understanding is the result
of a recognition of logical necessity.
In the mythic frame, the function of symbolization is to
"accompany, mediate, and condition" the content of experience in such
a way that the subject-object distinction emerges with the greatest
possible potentiality for future symbolization to be productive of
understanding. This can occur when the emergent objective realm is
conceptually structured in a way which already bears the essential
forms of logical relation, and when the subjective, realm retains the
greatest possible potentiality for imagination.
Burgess addresses both these ends. Structured within his
explanatory tales is the essential form of logical necessity:
Wien they had all gathered around the Great Pine, Old 
Mother West Wind pointed to the old nest way up in the 
top of it. "Is that your nest?" she asked Blacky the 
Crow.
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"It was. but I gave it to my cousin, Sammy Jay," said 
Blacky the Crow.
"Is that your nest, and may I have a stick out of it?" 
asked Old Mother West Wind of Sammy Jay.
"It is," said Sammy Jay, with his politest bow, "and 
you are welcome to a stick out of it." To himself he 
thought, "She will only take one from the top and that won't 
matter."
Old Mother West Wind suddenly puffed out her cheeks and 
blew so hard that she blew a big stick right out of the 
bottom of the old nest. Down it fell bumpity-bump on the 
branches of the Great Pine. After it fell— what do you 
think? Why, hickory nuts and chestnuts and acorns and 
hazelnuts, such a lot of them!
"Why, Why-e-‘e!" cried Happy Jack. "There are all my 
stolon nuts." (Burgess, 1910, chap. 10)
In the empirical-scientific frame, the function of symbolization 
is to imagine a case of hypothetical necessity (create a hypothesis) 
which, when tested against experience, proves to be a case of logical 
necessity and thus produces increased understanding. The essential 
term of this process is already embodied in the example previously 
given, the principal distinction being that here Old Mother West Wind 
is the exemplar of the process for the mythic mind of the child reader. 
Once this child render has taken responsibility for authorship of 
his own learning— his mind having emerged from the "crisis" of the. 
subject-object distinction— the essential form of logical proof will, 
through such examples, already be structured into the objective 
framework ol his mind. He will already possess the tools for tinder- 
st andi ng.
Summary
The specific characteristic which distinguishes human conscious­
ness is that of symbolic representation of experience. The aim of all 
symbolic forms is a unified representation of experience. The mythic 
form achieves unified representation through imagination, without need
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of logical relation. The empirical-scientific form, on the other
hand, aims at unified representation through the combined steps of
imagination (hypothesis) and judgment (synthesis). Development of
the empirical-scientific form must progress through a preliminary
mythic phase, and uhe emergence of the •subject-object distinction— in
both individual mind ana cultural history— marks the beginning of
empirical-scientific representation. The essential form of
empirical-scientific knowledge is "mediated and conditioned" by the*
essential form of the mythic representations xchich precede it.
From the comparative analysis of Burgess on these grounds, the 
following epistemological premises emerge:
1. In the education of a pre-logical mind, it is necessary 
that representations be mythic (i.e., unified) in order that maximum 
future creative potential be ensured.
2. In the education of a pre-logical mind, it is necessary 
that mythic representations be logically coherent in order that 
maximum potential for future scientific understanding be assured.
3. As learning progresses, both objective determinacy and 
responsibility for judgment increase respectively in the learner.
4. Objective content of representations need be factual only 
in proportion with the learner's empirical-scientific development, 
but the essential form of empirical-scientific thought must be 
consistent throughout development.
5. Content must form an unbroken link between what is familiar 
to the learner and what it is desired that he acquire in the way of 
determinate knowledge if interest is to be sustained.
CHAPTER V
Discussion and Conclusion
Suppose that someone wished to give his whole life to science. 
Suppose that he therefore sat down, pencil in hand, and for 
the next twenty, thirty, forty years recorded in notebook 
after notebook everything that he could observe. He may be 
supposed to leave out nothing: today's humidity, the racing 
results, the level of cosmic radiation and the stock market 
prices and the look of Mars, all would be there. He would 
have compiled the most careful record of nature that has ever 
been made; and, dying In the calm certainty of a life well 
spent, he would of course leave his notebooks to the Royal 
Society. Would the Royal Society thank him for the treasure 
of a lifetime of observation? It would not. It would refuse 
to open his notebooks at all, because it would know without 
looking that they contain only a jumble of disorderly and 
meaningless items. (Bronowski, 1956, pp. 24-25)
In giving this example, Bronowski. is making the point that science
cannot he considered a mere aggregate of factual data. As he says,
"Science finds order and meaning in our experience" (1956, p. 25).
That this is essentially a creative process, he leaves little doubt:
There is a likeness between the creative acts of the mind in 
art and in science . . . you cannot have a man handle paints 
or Language or the symbolic concepts of physics, you cannot 
even have him stain a microscope slide, without instantly 
waking in him a pleasure in the very language, a sense of 
exploring his own activity. This sense lies at the heart 
of creation. (1956, pp. 14, 16-17)
What is the essential form of this creative process? Bronowski 
concludes:
All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses.
. . . The scientist looks for order in the appearance of 
nature by exploring such likenesses. For order does not 
display itself of itself; if it can be said to be there
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at all, it is not there for the mere looking. There is no 
way of pointing a finger or a camera at it; order must be 
discovered and, in a deep sense, it must be created. (1956, 
pp. 23, 24)
This creative demand for unity is to be found at the root of 
every scientific endeavor, from the quest for a unified field theory 
in physics, to the Newtonian hope of explaining what links the falling 
apple and the orbiting moon, to the biological search for the reason 
that the larvae of Edward's Kairstreak prefer to live with ants.
For educators, the principal question, however, is neither whether 
nor why this is so, but how the process may be cultivated in the 
growing child: What arc the principles by which one cultivates the 
productive growth of this creative quest in the mind of the child?
Like Bronowski, Burgess rules out facts as the motivator. "Dry 
facts make no impression," writes Burgess (1922c, p. 139). It is not 
In the facts themselves that interest is sustained and meaning found, 
but in their creative relation to what is already known. Meaning 
resides not in the data of science, but in their relationships.
That apples fall and that the moon orbits the earth have no meaning 
in themselves, as mere data of experience. It was in the possibility 
of their causal relationship that interest lay for Newton. It was 
Newton's discovery of the law which links these processes, in which 
he determined between them a conception of causal unity, that 
produced the scientific meaning of these data. Science is a quest 
for meaning.
The young child also lives out a quest for meaning. As Burgess 
notes, the child's meanings are at first "enchanted" and run through 
with magic. Yet the child is already a potential scientist, asking
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"why?" at every turn. Like Newton, the child must define answers to 
his "whys" in terms of his own familiar world. Dry facts make no 
impression. Like Newton, the child has imagination. Add one fact, 
reasons Burgess, stimulate this imagination to seek an answer to 
"why" this fact is so, lav out an "empirical" path toward discovery 
of an answer— in terms familiar to the child— , and the. essential form 
of science is born.
There is no difference, in terms of essential form, between this
process and that recounted of Newton by Bronowski:
In this eager, boyish mood, sitting one day in the garden 
of his widowed mother, he saw an apple fall. . . . What 
struck the young Newton at the. sight was not the thought 
that the apple must be drawn to the earth by gravity: that 
conception was older than Newton. What struck him was the 
conjecture that the same force of gravity, which reaches 
to the top of the tree, might go on reaching out beyond 
the earth and its air, endlessly into space. Gravity might 
reach the moon: this was Newton's new thought; and it 
might be gravity which holds the moon in her orbit. There 
and then he calculated what force from the earth would hold 
the moon, and compared it with the known force of gravity 
at tree height. The forces agreed. (1956, p. 26)
Replace Newton with Old Mother West Wind, the question of what holds
the moon in her orbit with that of who stole Happy Jack's cache of
nuts, and the conjecture that it is the force of gravity with that
of the presence of those nuts in the old nest; add a little calculation
(remove a stick from the bottom of the nest); and "Why, why-e-e! There
are all my stolen nuts!"
Einstein has said that "the whole of science is nothing more than 
a refinement of every day thinking" (1950, p. 59). From this it 
follows that science education is the guidance of that refinement—  
beginning with "every day thinking." The "every day thinking" of a 
child has little to do with the subject matter of mature science— with
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concepts like "species," "atom," and "gravity." In its earliest 
stages, this "every day thinking" is mythic in form, as Cassirer has 
demonstrated. Even here, Burgess recognizes, the essential form of 
scientific thought may be laid down as a foundation, indeed without 
even the conscious knowledge of the child. Progressively the child 
may be led to assume responsibility for applying this form of thought, 
but always in terms of his own interest and imagination. "Nature 
presents an interest x̂ hich is inherent," notes Burgess. "It remains 
but to capitalize [sic] this by presenting that which it is desired 
to ?Lmpart in such form that the imagination becomes but a setting for 
the truth" (1922b, p. 139).
"Science," x^rites Einstein, "is the century-old endeavor to 
bring together by means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena 
of this world into as thoroughgoing an association as possible. To 
put it boldly, it is the attempt at the posterior reconstruction of 
existence by the process of conceptualization" (1954, p. 44). The 
result of this process is ever in flux, and, as Bronowski asserts,
"it admits no sharp boundary between knowledge and use" (1956, p. 15). 
"What a scientist does," Bronowski continues, ".is compounded of txi?o 
interests: the interest of his time and his oxvn interest" (1956,
p. 16).
Is it fair to expect the child to subordinate his oxvrn interest
to the interest of his time in history? The answer to this question
is at the foundation of the philosophy of science education. The
«
answer will reveal whether the child's culture, through its education 
system, conceives the role of science to be that of fulfilling the 
child's o\im native interest in the world, or that of fulfilling the
L02
interests of the cultu/e. It will likewise reveal whether the culture 
conceives science to be n  independent quest for truth or an expedient 
to some end. In a word, it will reveal the degree to which the 
culture conceives the chil 1 to be free.
The history of science displays immense shifts in the conception 
of reality— the "Copernican revolution," the advent of atomic and 
relativity theories, for example. Science begins with Thales' 
hypothesis in the sixth century B.C. that 6e twv itdvxwv u6wp uitearnaaTO^  
(of all things water is the substance), and reaches a culmination in 
Einstein's unifying conception of the relation of matter and energy:
OE = mc^. However mythic the form of Thales hypothesis may be, in
intention it is scientific, for as Allen notes:
Thales' question, understood' through its answer, assumes 
that at Least two things are true: that all things have 
a source, and tiiat the source of all things is one thing.
The universe is bound to a single principle, the primordial 
water, by a single relation, that of derivation. Nature is 
one whole, with unchanging ways of its own, to be accounted 
for in terms of a unitary principle of explanation. Thales 
appears to have been the first man in history to suggest 
that there is an order i 1 nature which the mind can 
comprehend. (1966, p. 2)
Through numerous shifts these products of creative quest have • 
passed— from the "red-and-white whale" of Thales' u6wp to the 
"fleshed out" Slbbaldus museulus of Einstein’s universe. The key to 
these shifts has been the interplay of creative freedom and logical 
necessity. Thus has the single Aoyoq of. Heraclitus been increasingly 
defined and determined in what science terms natural law.
Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms demonstrates that this 
progression is, in terms of form, recapitulated in the individual.
In the beginning, the mind is "plastic," its representations mythic.
In its progress, the mind increases the determinacy of its
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representations through the interplay of hypothesis and judgment.
A new dimension is added in the case of the modern individual, for 
there exist, as never for Thales, the determinate products of science. 
Education is faced with the question: Is science education the 
transfer of these determinate products (i.e., facts) or the progressive 
culturing of creative freedom in scientific form?
Burgess' answer to this question is that it is both. His 
children's nature stories are his practical contribution to education 
of both sorts, at the foundation. The degree to which they are in 
accord with the determinate facts of biological science and with 
Cassirer's conception of the development of empirical-scientific form 
is an indication of Burgess' depth of insight not only into the child 
mind but Into the essential form of the' process of science itself.
Burgess' animal stories reveal more than this, however, for 
they also give evidence that there is a progression of the degree of 
importance of determinate facts in science education. Subordinate 
to the essential form of science itself, facts in the beginning are 
merely indices to moral lessons given in mythic form. Later they are 
axial points, in a systematic proof of moral principles. Finally they 
will be the starting points, as they were for Newton, of the processes 
of hypothesis and judgment through which the body of mature scientific 
knowledge grows. Burgess has recognized that the foundation of 
science education is the essential form of science Itself, not merely 
its inventory of conceptual products. Moreover, he has recognized 
that the content of this form of science must, for the child as for 
the scientist, belong to what is already familiar to him. Hence the
accent on primary human values, human moral lessons, the fundamental
104
content of the child's life, and the substance of his "every day 
thinking."
Application of Findings
There are three areas in which these findings are of importance:
(a) the analysis of children's nature literature, (b) the creation of
nature literature for children, and (c) the development of curriculum
in preliminary science education for preschool and elementary grades.
From the five epistemological premises derived in chapter 4, the
following five principles of application are construed.
Beginning nature liter_ature and scienee curriculum for children
shjnuId concretely represent nature as a unif ied whole . Burgess
accomplishes this in his early stories in the concrete personification
of Old Mother Nature, whose frequently assembled dominion includes
"all the creatures of the Green Meadows, Green Forest, Old Pasture
and Smiling Pool." The function of such representation is that it
"conditions and mediates" future creative inquiry as a search for
unified meaning. As Cassirer has observed, "facts are valid not
insofar as they reproduce a given rigid being, but insofar as they
comprise a project for possible postulations of unity" (1957, p. 476).
This accords with Einstein's description of the aim of mature science:
The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension as 
complete as.possible, of the connection between the sense 
experiences in their^otality, and, on the other hand, the 
accomplishment of this aim by the use of a minimum of primary 
concepts and relations. (Seeking, as far as possible, logical 
unity in the world picture, i.e., paucity in logical elements.) 
(1950, p. 63)
The objective of the earliest stages of Science education is to 
firmly establish this idea of unity at which science aims and without 
which science would neither be coherent nor possible.
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Beginning nature literature and science curriculum should link 
this unified representation to the child's "image-world" in terms 
already familiar to the child. This unified whole must be defined in
terms familiar to the child's own life, and its essential form must
9therefore be that of myth. If Einstein's formula, E = me", is taken 
to be a near approximation to the unified representation of nature in 
mature scientific terms, then Old Mother Nature is Burgess’ personifi­
cation of the conceptual unity inherent in the genesis of that 
formulation. It is a personification precisely because it must be 
in order to have meaning for the child. Its meaning is unity nonethe­
less, its concreteness merely a necessary function of the mythic nature 
of the child's mind.
Early nature literature and science curriculum should represent
to the child a body of_logical relations within the unified whole.
While a unified concrete representation sustains the creative potential 
of the child, Internal logical consistency in the relation of elements 
within the whole assures future precision in judgment. Burgess 
accomplishes this through the plots and story lines in his tales. 
Logical elements at this stage need not be those of mature science, 
but they must be internally consistent within the whole, representing 
accurately the essential form of proof. The fundamental model of 
logical coherence within the whole.is that of justice. Within his 
utcetpov, Anaximander notes that rotOra . . . 61.5duett, yap auto 6t?*nv kat 
tdauv aAAnXous Tils aSuxcas xaxet rnv xo0 x p°vou xdEtv7 (Things bestow 
justice and compensation upon one another for injustice, according 
to the arrangement of time).
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As in the world of Anaximander, in the natural realm of Burgess'
tales concrete proof takes the form of justice:
If Peter Rabbit does something wrong, [children] want him 
to be punished. And when that happens, they think they 
understand the lesson even better than Peter does.
(Levine, 1967, p. 103)
Logical elements within Burgess' stories are his means of cultivating 
in the child the belief that a character has been.justly treated, 
that retribution has occurred. Justice is logical balance for the 
child, as it was for Anaximander. Within the whole of a story, 
justice represents and anticipates a logical balance and order within 
nature, one and the same order for which Bronowski notes that science 
is searching.
Nature literature and science, curriculum for children should 
progressively transfer responsibility for determining these logical 
relations to the child. Once the idea of a unified whole of nature 
has been firmly adopted by the child, and logical coherence has been 
determined to be the necessary form of unification, die next step in 
science education is to transfer responsibility for judgment to the 
Learner himself. This process, in Burgess' writings, is achieved 
through suggestion and systematic revelation. Here, Burgess is 
emphatic that the essential elements of synthesis must be factually 
correct. Not only must the responsibility for judgment now be the 
child's, but also the subject matter judged must now be the actual 
material of nature. There remains at this phase the need for derived 
meanings to be. forged in terms of the child's own familiar world.
The hypotheses furnished are therefore moral hypotheses which treat 
issues familiar to the child's "every day thinking."
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It is at this level of development that most of Burgess' writings 
are aimed, although in The Burgess Bird Book for Children (Burgess, 
1919c); The Burgess Animal Book for Children (Burgess, 1920b);
The Burgess Flower Book for Children (Burgess, 1923a); and some later 
works, he stepped beyond this level to generate hypotheses of a purely 
scientific, nature.
Nature literature and science curriculum ftr children should 
eventually lead the child to form his own creative hypotheses about 
relations within the whole of nature. In this final phase, 
responsibility not only for judgments but also for creation of his 
own hypotheses should be transferred to the child, once this has 
been accomplished, the child will be in possession of all the essential 
abilities necessary to perform independent scientific thinking. He 
will be able, in response to his own questions, to create hypothetical 
answers aimed at unification, co logically judge the validity of his 
experiences within that framework, and to adjust his determinate 
knowledge on-the basis of his conclusions. His "every day thinking" 
will have been refined to the essential form of mature science.
Need for Further Study
The present investigation has been merely exploratory, and while 
the premises derived are consistent with Cassirer's philosophy and 
reveal Burgess' application of the principles of symbolic form, much 
work remains to be done if these premises are to be refined to the 
point of a thorough understanding. Three areas in particular remain 
to be examined:
1. Are there measurable behaviors which will indicate a child's 
level of development along the lines defined above, and if so, what.
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are they? Burgess' presentation of nature was largely without 
feedback, and the result of a systematic examination of its long-term 
effect in development of scientific literacy would be a valuable 
contribution to education research. Testimony of a number of nature 
writers who read Burgess as children (Pettingill, 1983; Ross, in 
Burgess, 1968; Spies, 1966) indicates that he was a strong force in 
their development as naturalists.
2. What other patt'rns of logical construction are definable 
within the "representative wholes" which Burgess has created?
Justice and its resulting balance is the most readily apparent 
recurring motif within the framework of Burgess plots. There are- 
others, however. In numerous of the later works there is the motif 
of mystery, search, and solution— for example, the search in
The Adventures of Jerry Muskrat (Burgess, 19.14c) for the reason the 
Smiling Pool is drying up, or the question in Blacky the Crow 
(Burgess, 1922a) of why there are eggs in a hawk's nest in winter.
This motif may suggest the beginnings of Burgess' cultivation of the 
skill of hypothesis in his child reader. A thorough analysis of such 
recurring internal motifs would be of considerable value in further 
defining Burgess' method.
3. What other children's nature literature accords with this 
method of science instruction? For oxn^pie, are Kipling's (1978)
Just So Stories to be classed as "explanatory tales" in the same 
sense as Burgess' Mother West Wind stories? Certainly they offer 
explanations of natural data, but do they do so in a way that is 
productive of future scientific thinking, or are they merely entertain 
ment? A comparative analysis of Burgess and other writers of animal
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and nature stories, or other analyses comparing them with Cassirer's, 
principles, would be of value in further defining the role of children's 
nature literature in the development of scientific literacy.
Conclusion
Without recognizing the symbolic form of his works, past critical 
descriptions of Burgess have reduced him to a writer for children 
whose nature stories are "charming," whose animal characters admittedly 
adhere to natural habit, but whose purpose in introducing them to the 
child is little more than to advocate the protection of wildlife from 
the "terrible guns." Certainly this was one of Burgess' aims, but 
bringing Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms to an investigation 
of Burgess reveals other and deeper aims. Indeed, through this 
approach there emerge two Burgesses: one the naturalist whom many 
have recognized, and the other a teacher whose insight few have 
understood. It is Burgess the naturalist who recognizes a universal 
Interest in animals and birds, but: it is Burgess the teacher who 
recognizes that because of this interest "nature study is unequalled 
as a vehicle for conveying information of all kinds."
The philosophy of symbolic forms reunites these Burgesses, 
revealing the fundamental unity of vision which pervades all his 
stories and which gives rise to their hidden potency. The principles 
of symbolic form reveal that it is not merely the obvious facts and 
events in Burgess' stories which "convey information" to the child, 
but their synthetic and symbolic unity— the synthesizing of which the 
child is given to share and the effect of which the child will carry 
long after the particular facts and events have been forgotten.
This central concept of symbolic form determines the ground which





^Dowhan (1977) lists S2 article titles with dates before 1910, 
and annually adds to this list as other titles are discovered. During 
this period Burgess served on the staff of Peoples Home Journal and 
wrote for several other magazines. See Burgess (I960, pp. 70-96) for 
further explanation.
2For original Greek text, see Diels (19 5A, p. 173). Parenthetic 
translation is the present author’s,
2For original Greek text, see Diels (1954, p. 161). Parenthetic 
translation is the present author's.
,JFor original Greek text, see Diels (1954, p.  89). Parenthetic 
translation Is the present author's.
•’In the two passages which follow in the main text. Lev i-Strauss' 
original French is preserved for the sake of accuracy. The following 
translations, rendered by the present author, are here given in the 
same order as they appear in the text.
Now, lliis demand for order is at the base of the thought we call 
primitive, but only inasmuch as it is at the base of all thought: for 
it is from the angle of common properties that we can accede more 
easily to forms of thought which seem very strange to us. (1962, p. 17)
Magic thought is not a rudimentary beginning, a rough sketch, or 
a yet unrealized part, of a whole; it forms a well articulated system; 
independent, in this respect, from that other system which constitutes 
science, except for the formal analogy which reconciles them and makes 
the first a sort of metaphoric expression of the second. Therefore, 
instead of contrasting magic and science, it is preferable to put them 
in parallel, as two modes of knowing, unequal with regard to theoretical 
and practical results (for, from this point, it is true that science 
succeeds better than magic, although magic anticipates (preforme) 
science in that it also sometimes succeeds), but not unequal in the 
sort of mental operations that they suppose, and which differ less in 
nature than in the function of the types of phenomena to which they 
a pp 1 y thcm.se Ives. (1962, p . 2 1)
(lSco Diogenes Laertius (1980, p. 26) for original Greek text. 
Parenthetic translation is the present author's.
/For original Greek text, see Diels (1954, p. 89). Parenthetic 





Burgess, T. W. (1905) The bride's primer. New York: The Phelps 
Publishing Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1910). Old Mother West: Wind. Boston: Little. Brown 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1911). Mother West Wind's children. Boston: Little, 
Drown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1912a). The Bov Scouts of Woodcraft Camp. Philadelphia: 
Penn Publishing Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1912b). Mother West Wind’s animal, friends. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1913a). The adventures of Johnny Chuck. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1913b). The adventures of Reddy Fox. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1913c); The Boy Scouts on Swift River. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1913d-). Mother Wes t _WlncI' s neighbors. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, W. (1914a). The adventures of_ Jerry Muskrat. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1914b). The adventures of Mr. Mocker. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1914c). The adventures of Peter Cottontail. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (I914.d). The adventures of Unc* Billy Possum. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1914c).• The Boy Scouts on Lost Trail. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915a). The adventures of Chatterer the red squirrel. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
114
115
Burgess, T. W. (1915b). The adventures of Danny Meadow Mouse.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915c). The adventures of Crandfather Frog. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915d). The adventures of Sammy Jay. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915e). The Boy Scouts in a trapper’s camp. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915f). Mother Ivst Wind "why" stories. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1915g). Tommy and the wishing stone. New York: 
Century.
Burgess, T. W. (1916a) . The adventures of Buster Bear. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1916b) . The adventures of Old Man Coyote . Boston
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1916c) . The adventures of Old Mr. Toad. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Bu rgess , i’. W . (1916d). The adventures of Prickly Porky. Boston:
L i. 1 1 .le, Br own a nd Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1916c) . Mother West Wind ''how'' stories. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1917a). The adventures of Paddy the beaver. Boston:
Li 11 le, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1917b). The adventures of Poor Mrs. Quack. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1917c). Mother West Wind "when," stories. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. lv. (1918a). The adventures of Bobby Coon. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1918b). The adventures of Jimmy Skunk. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1918c). Happy Jack. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1918d). Mother West Wind "where" stories. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
116
Burgess, T. W. (1919a). The adventures of Bob White. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1919b). The adventures of 01' Mistah Buzzard.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1919c). The Burgess bird book Cor children. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1919d, May). The gold mine I discovered when I was 
35- The American Magazine, pp. 36-37, 80-90.
Burgess, T. W. (1919e). Mrs. Peter Rabbit. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1920a). Bowser the hound. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1920b). The Burgess animal, book for children. Boston 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1920c). Old Granny Fox. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1921a). Light foot the deer. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1921b). Tommy's change of heart. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1921c). Tommy's wishes come true. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1922a). Blacky the crow. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1922b, March). Nature as the universal teacher. 
Natural History, pp. 137-140.
Burgess, T. W. (1922c). Whltefoot the wood mouse. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company.
BurgeSS, T. W. (1923a). The Burgess flower book for children. Boston 
Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1923b). Buster Bear's twins. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1923c, March). Writing stories for a million 
children. The Rotarian, pp. 135-137, 171.
Burgess, T. W. (1924a). Billy Mink. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.
117
Burgess, T. W. (1924b, January). Nature study the key to knowledge. 
Nature, pp. 47-49, 62.
Burgess, X. W. (1925). 
Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1926). 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1927). 
and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1945). 
New York: Grosset
Little Joe Otter. Boston: Little, Brown arid
Jerry Muskrat at home. Boston: Little, Brown
Longlegs the heron. Boston: Little, Brown
Mother West Wind "when" stories (2nd ed.). 
and Dunlap.
Burgess, T. W. (1953). Little. Joe Otter (2nd ed.) . New York:
Grosset and Dunlap.
Burgess, T. W. (1955). Aunt Sally’s friends in fur: Or the Woodhouse 
Night Club. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1960). Now 1 remember: Autobiography of an American 
naturalist. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1962). Mother West Wind's children (3rd ed.).
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Burgess, T. W. (1968). Mother West Wind's neighbors (3rd ed.) . 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Works by Cassire_r
Cassirer, E. (1946). The myth of the state. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
Cassirer, E. (1947). Rousseau, Kant., Goethe: Two essays. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1953a). Language and myth. New' York: Dover.
Cassirer, E. (1953b). The philosophy of symbolic forms (Vol. 1)»
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1953c). Substance and function. New York: Dover.
Cassirer, E. (1954). The question of Jean-.Tacques Rousseau.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1955). The, philosophy of symbolic forms (Vol. 2).
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1956). Determinism and Indeterminism in modern physics. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
118
Cassirer, E. (1957). The philosophy of symbolic forms (Vol. 3).
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1960). The problem of knowledge. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Cassirer, E.. (1963). The individual and the cosmos in Renaissance
philosophy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Cassirer, E. (1966a). An essay on man. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
Cassirer, E. (1966b). The logic of the humanities. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1979). Symbol, mvth and culture. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Other References
Allen, K. E. (1966). Greek philosophy: Thales to Aristotle. New 
York: The Free Press.
Agosta, L. (1983). Thornton W. Burgess. In Dictionary of literary 
biography: Children, 1900-1960 (Vol. 22, pp. 71-87). Detroit: 
Gal ■ Research Company.
Be rgson, H. (1912). Matter and memory.
Bergson, H. (1913). Time and free will
Company,
Bergson, H. (1965). An introduction to
Totowa. NJ: LLtt.lefield, Adams and
New York: Macmillan.
. London: George Allen and
metaphysics: The creative 
Company.
mind.
Boas, F. (1938). The mind of primitive man. New York: Macmillan.
Boulton, D. (n.d.). The use of fantasy nature stories as expressions 
of Jungian concepts. Unpublished monograph, Mercy Hospital, 
Springfield, MA.
Bronowki, J. (1956). Science and human values. New York: Julian 
Messher, Inc.
Brooks, P. (1980). Speaking for nature. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company.
Bryan, J., III. (1940). Mother Nature's apostle. Saturday Review 
of Literature, 2_3, 11-13.
Bull, J., & Farrand, J., Jr. (1977). The Audubon Society field
guide to North American birds: Eastern region. New York: Alfred 
Knopf.
119
Burgess publishes 10,000 nature stories. (1944). Publisher's Weekly, 
.145, 689.
The Burgess radio nature league. (1925). Literary Digest, 813, 30.
Burt, W. (1972). Mammals of the Great Lakes region. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
Carlson, P. (1969). Thornton W. Burgess: An author with a naturalistic 
point of view. Unpublished terra paper, Keene State College, Keene, 
NH.
Cleve, F. (1965). Giants of pre-Socratic-philosophy. The Hague: 
Martinum Nijhoff.
Commire, A. (1979). Something about the author (Vol. 17). Detroit: 
Gale Research Book Tower.
de Santillana, G. (1961). The origins of scientific thought. New 
York: New American Library.
Deutsch, E. (1969). Advaita vedanta: A philosophical reconstruction. 
Honolulu: East-West Center Press.
Diels, II. (1954). Die cragmente der vorsokrat.iker [Pre-Socratic
fragments] (Vol. 1). Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandl^ng.
Diogenes Laertius. (1980). Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers 
In ten books (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dowhan, M., Jr. (1977). Thornton W. Burgess: A magazine bibliography. 
Williams town, MA: Chapel Hill Press.
Einstein, A. (1950). Out of my later years. New York: PI ilosophical 
Library.
Einstein, A. (1954). Ideas and opinions. New York: Crowt Publishers.
Fox, D. (1964, September-October). Thornton W. Burgess recalls a 
90-year romance with nature. Audubon Magazine, pp. 312-313.
Froman, R. (1947, November). Thornton Burgess: Peter Rabbit's god­
father. Coronet, pp. 146-150.
Furman, L. (1948, October). The woodhouse night club. Nature- 
Magazine, 409-4l1.
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962). A history of Greek philosophy: Vol. 1.
The earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans. London: Cambridge 
University Press.
Harris, A., Jr. (1956, January). The bedtime story man. Nature 
Magazine, 17-19, 52.
120
Heidegger, M. (1975). Early Greek chinking (D.. Krell & F. Capuzzi, 
Trans.). New York: Harper and Row. (Original works published 
1950, 1954)
Hubbard, C. T. (1969, October). The mice that sing. Yankee, p. 132.
Ts this a fair deal? (1941, February). Reader's Digest, pp. 127-128.
Kant, I. (1929). Critique of pure reason (N. K. Smith, Trans.). 
London: Macmillan.
Kenney, H. (1948, January). Neighbor Burgess. Christian Science 
Monitor, pp. 8-9.
Kipling, R. (1978). Just so stories. New York: Weathervane Books.
Kirk, G. S. (1971). Myth: Its meaning and function In ancient and
other cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kirk, G. S., & Raven, J. E. (1957). The Presocratic philosophers. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klibanskv, R. , & Patori, H. J. (1963). Philosophy and history: The. 
Ernst Cassirer festschrift. New York: Harper and Row.
Krutc.h, J. (1960). A natural world of make-believe. Saturday Review,
p. 18.
Langer, S. (1974). Philosophy in a new key. Cambridge: Hat 'rard 
University Press.
Life visits the bedtime-story man at Laughing Brook. (1944, August). 
... Life, pp. 99-102.
Le Roy, E. (1913). The new philosophy of Henri Bergson. New York: 
Henry Holt and Company.
Levi-Bruhl, L. (1926). How natives think. London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd.
Levine, L. (1967, October). Unforgettable Thornton W. Burgess.
Reader's Digest, pp. 100-105.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1962). La pensee sauvage. Paris: Libra trie Plon.
Lovell, R. (1974). The Cape Cod storv of Thornton W. Burgess.
Sandwich, MA: The Thornton W. Burgess Society, Inc.
The man who made children love bedtime. (1937, March). Saturday 
Review of Literature, p. 16A.
Meigs, C., Eaton, A., Nesbitt, E., & Viquers, R. (1953). A critical 
history of children's literature. New York: Macmillan.
121
Nash, 0. (1955, January). Mr. Burgess, meet Mr. Barmecide. New
Yorker, p. 26.
Noble, C. (1931). The biology of amphibia. New York: McGraw Hill. ^
Nordell, R. (1960, September). The Burgess world of animals and
children: A golden anniversary by the laughing brook. Christian 
Science Monitor (Eastern Edition), p. 11.
O'Donnell, R. (1978, April). The home of Peter Rabbit. Ford Times, 
pp. 61-64.
Oliver, J. (1955). The natural history of North American amphibians 
and reptiles. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Company.
O'Neill, P. (1960, November). Fifty years in the green meadow.
Life, pp. 112-114.
One man's kingdom. (I960, September). Newsweek, p. 122.
Onians, R. B. (1951). The origins of European thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Pettingill, 0., Jr. (1983, September). The legacy of Peter Rabbit. 
Audubon Magazine, pp. 99-101.
Robin, L . (1963). La pensee Creeque et les origines de 1. 'esprit
sclent1f ique [Greek thought and the origins of the scientific 
spirit[. Paris: Editions Alb In Michel.
Rover, R. (1980). The nature of_things. Palisade, MN: Woodcock
Enterprises.
Royer, R. (1982). Conservation education: Making the right connections. 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, • _3_7, 326-327.
Rover, R. (1983). In the owl's voice. Palisade, MN: Woodcock 
En terprises.
Salttord, H. (1973, June). A man, his dream, and a happy ending.
Yankee, pp. 94-95, 184-18S.
Schilpp. P. (Ed.). (1958). The philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. New
York: Tudor Publishing.
Seidell, G. J. (1964). Martin Heidegger and the pre-Socratics.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Shepherd, W. (1920, May). The bedtime story man. Red Cross Magazine, 
pp. 14-17.
Spies, J. (1966). The comp.leal cat. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc.
122
Xante, D. (Ed.). (1931). Living authors: A book of biographies.
New York: H. W. Wilson Company.
Thornton W. Burgess and his nature stories for children. (1955). 
Publisher's Weekly, 168, 316-317.
Walsh, L. (1927, August). Million children would choose him for 
president— at bed-time. Cape Cod Magazine and Cape Cod Life, 
pp. 7-8, 15.
When do we eat?' (1922, March). The Outlook, pp. 330-331.
Wright, W. (1979). Thornton W. Burgess: A descriptive book
bibliography. Sandwich, MA: The Thornton W. Burgess Society.
Burgess Obituaries
Obituary. (1965, June 14) . Publisher 's Weekly, 187.
occ
Obituary. (1965, June 18) . Time, p. 50.
Ob 11 ua r v . (1965, June 21) Newsweek, p. 90.
Obituary. (1965, Septembe r 15). Li.brary Journal , _9_0, 3715.
Rites for Burgoss set for tomorrow. ( 1965, June 7). The New York
TLme_s, p. 37.
Thornton Burgess dead at 91;- author of "Peter Rabbit" 
dune 6). The New_York Timies, p. 8.4.
stories. (1965,
